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Abstract 
 
 
There is a robust international debate about how best to tackle spatial inequalities within 
nations and regions. The paper discusses three contrasting approaches: spatial rebalancing, 
space-neutral and place-based. They vary in the scope and purpose of government policy, 
from redistributing economic activity, to facilitating aggregate growth, and realising the 
economic potential of less-developed regions. The paper applies this framework to analyse 
South Africa’s five decades of experience of spatial policies. The context is one of stark 
spatial inequalities, uneven institutional capabilities, and mounting political pressure for 
change. Under apartheid, spatial targeting was highly instrumental and played a role in 
reproducing social divisions at considerable financial cost. Since the end of apartheid there 
has been much experimentation with spatial initiatives, but without any overarching vision 
or policy framework. A cautionary conclusion is that there are risks of extravagant spending 
in marginal locations when political pressures are strong, public institutions are weak and 
economic disciplines are lacking. Another is that place-based policies have potential, but 
require stronger vertical and horizontal policy alignment to stand any chance of tackling 
entrenched spatial divides. Enhanced local institutions involving private sector and 
community stakeholders are also essential for spatial policies to respond to the specific 
challenges and opportunities encountered in each place. 
 
Key words: local and regional development; spatial targeting 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
There is a renewed battle of ideas about the best way to tackle spatial inequalities within 
nations and regions (Barca, 2009; OECD, 2009; World Bank, 2009; McCann, 2016). The 
contest between different approaches has been spurred by heightened competition for 
investment in a context of economic volatility and geopolitical uncertainty. A popular 
backlash against globalisation in many lagging regions has added to the pressure for new 
solutions to uneven development, reflected in international commitments to ‘leave no-one 
behind’ in the Sustainable Development Goals and other agreements. A series of other 
contemporary challenges also threaten regional prosperity, including growing 
protectionism, rising social inequality, disruptive technologies, resource scarcity and fiscal 
austerity. Meanwhile, new theories of economic growth have also invigorated the spatial 
policy debate, with their emphasis on endogenous (internal) causal processes, 
agglomeration economies and institutions (Pike et al., 2010, 2017; Glaeser, 2011; Barca et 
al., 2012; Storper, 2013). These notions all stress the influence of geography on economic 
performance. The issues at stake are multi-dimensional and cut across established academic 
disciplines and policy silos.    
 
Some simple distinctions are immediately apparent. On the one hand, it has been argued 
that governments should avoid singling out particular regions for special support (‘spatial 
targeting’) because it is more reliable and efficient for market forces to determine which 
places prosper (World Bank, 2009; Glaeser, 2011; Cheshire et al., 2014). Successful towns 
and cities will emerge more or less spontaneously and it is almost impossible for 
governments to turn-around localities whose economic base has collapsed. They should 
conserve their resources and respond to places with proven demand for business growth 
and household preferences. As these areas prosper, stronger links to poorer regions 
through trade and migration (‘economic integration’) will spread income and narrow the 
wealth gap (World Bank, 2009). Redirecting jobs and resources to under-performing regions 
will merely curb economic efficiency, hamper growth and reduce aggregate welfare. 
Instead, governments should focus on ‘space-neutral’ (or ‘spatially-blind’) policies which 
target poor people and equip them with the capabilities to access opportunities wherever 
they arise. Large cities are most likely to function as engines of growth because of the 
advantages of economic concentration and density for productivity and innovation (Wojan, 
2016; Lall et al., 2017). In other words, there is a kind of inevitability to spatial outcomes 
that governments shouldn’t interfere with because it’s futile to fly in the face of economic 
reality by trying to buck the market (Gill, 2010).   
 
On the other hand, it has been argued that governments should have explicit spatial 
targeting policies because there is potential for growth in many regions besides big cities 
(Barca, 2009; OECD, 2009; Storper, 2010; Dijkstra, 2013). Private firms and markets cannot 
be relied upon to realise these opportunities because of inadequate information, risk-
aversion, inertia or other failures. Collective action by governments and civil society can 
improve the fortunes of places by creating conducive environments to guide private 
investment decisions and to support productive activity. Governments can and should do 
more than respond passively to business location choices and household migration patterns 
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after the event because inefficient forms of urban development may get locked-in. Policies 
should be sensitive to latent local assets and under-utilised resources, and address the 
binding constraints that hamper investment and growth, such as weak institutions. A 
growing literature on ‘place-based’ development suggests that local and regional assets and 
know-how are foundations of national prosperity (Barca et al., 2012; Hildreth and Bailey, 
2014). Places are ‘sticky’ in that they attract and embed productive investment, human 
capital and associated resources through intense local interactions. These synergies can 
generate economic dynamism by creating and strengthening comparative advantage 
through distinctive territorial capabilities, technologies and economic specialisations which 
are steadily upgraded and enhanced over time (Storper, 2013).  
 
This process of growth is always imperfect, uncertain and uneven, as regions follow 
different paths. Effective governance, leadership and collaboration among stakeholders can 
shape their development trajectories. Joint problem-solving, mutual learning and focused 
action to address specific local needs can all help to foster progress. Places function as 
active agents to stimulate and sustain productive activity, and not inert containers or 
receptacles for the location decisions of firms (Pike et al., 2010, 2017; Barca, 2011). 
Furthermore, economic integration through trade between regions is no panacea because it 
may widen rather than narrow the prosperity gap by reinforcing the strengths of well-
endowed areas and depleting the resources of other territories. Leading cities may become 
disengaged, or ‘decoupled’, from their surrounding regions and more entwined with other 
global cities, so the spread effects may never filter through (McCann, 2016). Economic 
activity and political power may become over-concentrated in the primary city and the 
resulting inflationary pressures and congestion may act as a brake on national growth (Amin 
et al, 2003; Martin, 2015). Migration is also not a smooth or painless process. It may cause 
social dislocation and instability, sometimes in both places of origin and destination. 
Therefore, spatial policies can have valuable national as well as local benefits, including 
realising the untapped potential of less-developed areas, mitigating the costs of disruptive 
territorial divides, and relieving bottlenecks in over-heated regions.  
 
There is a long history of spatial targeting policies in European countries. They have evolved 
from traditional efforts to steer investment and jobs from affluent to poor regions through 
large financial incentives and major infrastructure schemes, towards more complex regional 
development strategies managed by partnerships of local and regional stakeholders (Pike et 
al., 2017). Advocates of the space-neutral approach criticise them for going against the grain 
of market forces, hindering agglomeration tendencies, adding to the tax burden, and 
jeopardising growth (World Bank, 2009; Nathan and Overman, 2013; Cheshire et al., 2014). 
Proponents of place-based policies criticise them for different reasons - their top-down, 
standardised character, aiming to attract similar industries using identical instruments, and 
not doing enough to build upon existing regional assets, to renew local institutions, or to 
modernise outdated economic structures (Barca et al., 2012; Pike et al., 2017). Indeed, the 
European Union (EU) has steadily reduced support for physical infrastructure projects and 
the subsidies that governments are permitted to offer firms in order to prevent wasteful 
beggar-my-neighbour behaviour between regions and to stop them from trying to prop-up 
declining industries with slim chances of survival (Garcilazo, 2011; Turok, 2004).  
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The EU’s new place-based policies seek to boost development from within by bolstering 
indigenous strengths and branching out into new and related economic activities (Barca, 
2009; Barca et al., 2012; Hildreth and Bailey, 2014; McCann, 2016). They are not restricted 
to the poorest regions, and resources are not allocated according to standard formulae. 
Strategies are more nuanced and negotiated among stakeholders to encourage greater 
creativity and adaptability over time. They are broader in scope than traditional regional 
policies, recognising the need to overcome diverse local constraints and unlock the unique 
potential of each place. Fresh thinking is encouraged by mobilising different sources of 
expertise, energy and networks. A multi-level approach is important, involving national 
authorities and sometimes international bodies injecting ideas, resources and disciplines, 
such as ensuring citizen accountability and regular evaluation to improve policy 
performance over time. External actors need to challenge entrenched local interests that 
may have narrow, self-seeking agendas, parochial tendencies or weak institutional 
capabilities (Barca, 2011; Tomaney, 2013; Boschma, 2014).  
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine South Africa’s (SA) five decades of spatial targeting 
policies in the light of these debates, and using a three-fold framework of spatial 
rebalancing, space-neutral and place-based approaches. The intention is to contribute new 
insights into the theory and practice of spatial policies by exploring evidence from a quite 
different context beyond Europe. SA is one of the most unequal and unevenly developed 
countries in the world. It also experienced a remarkably peaceful transition to democracy 
two decades ago, indicating some success in terms of national cohesion. Large parts of the 
country were deliberately under-developed historically and entire communities were 
forcibly removed off well-located urban land to marginal areas on the periphery. The black 
majority of the population was disempowered educationally and left with inferior 
healthcare and other public services. A coercive migrant labour system was the only option 
for many men to earn a livelihood. The entrenched social and spatial inequalities have 
created enormous pressures for social redress and spatial rebalancing. They coincide with 
formidable obstacles to change, such as very uneven institutional capabilities and 
infrastructure in different places. Such immense geographical disparities cannot be resolved 
simply by devolving decision-making to disadvantaged regions or accelerating rural-urban 
migration. The paper analyses the experience of regional policies in the apartheid and post-
apartheid eras, including industrial decentralisation and special economic zones. Area-based 
initiatives focused on the former black urban townships and decaying inner cities are also 
assessed. The evidence base includes a unique collection of original programme evaluations, 
together with a range of secondary literature and insights from interviews with key actors. 
 
A mixed picture emerges from the analysis. SA has examples of long-standing spatial policies 
driven by narrow ideological objectives that generated few enduring benefits, despite 
offering some of the most generous incentives available in the world. They neglected 
economic principles and lacked understanding of the underlying problems or empathy for 
the communities concerned. There are also more recent examples of well-conceived 
initiatives that were hampered by poor government coordination and vision, resulting in 
duplication of effort, inconsistency and dissipation of resources. A third group of initiatives 
have had surprisingly positive outcomes in inauspicious places. This is attributable more to 
determined implementation than to sound design. Capable organisations with energetic, 
well-connected leaders were able to mobilise substantial public and private investment.  
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Several wider lessons for spatial policy also emerge from SA’s eclectic experience. Spatial 
targeting is not inherently inefficient and ineffective. However, it is not necessarily 
straightforward or successful either, and there is considerable scope for improvement. 
Generalisations about the superiority of particular kinds of spatial policies are problematic 
because so much depends on the national and local context, and on the conditions of 
implementation. Spatial policies are potentially valuable mechanisms for coordinating and 
focusing government action, yet they need to be grounded in economic realities and 
institutional capabilities. Spatial initiatives are most useful if reinforced by other state 
powers and resources, and implemented in partnership with other actors.  
 
Three particular issues warrant more attention in the literature on spatial targeting. First, all 
spatial policies are conditioned by the structure and dynamics of the economy. It makes a 
big difference whether the economy is open to new enterprise, competition and diversity, 
or whether ownership, control and know-how are concentrated and there are many barriers 
and rigidities in the system. Transforming spatial trajectories is much more difficult in a 
relatively stagnant, unchanging economy. Second, social cohesion makes it easier to 
introduce and sustain spatial policies. SA’s experience is that launching initiatives in very 
deprived environments is difficult because communities are fractious and institutions 
fragile. Development efforts need strategies for building trust, stability and shared agendas. 
Third, institutional capacity is required at local and national levels. State capacity is often 
weakest and least reliable in the places that most need support. One cannot assume the 
existence of an organised state capable of absorbing devolved powers and resources, 
devising innovative plans and implementing agreed decisions. Special efforts are necessary 
to build and maintain competent and accountable local and regional governments, with 
oversight and support from central government.  
 
The balance between national and local action ought to vary depending on the 
circumstances. Additional national investment, enhanced technical assistance and a more 
assertive role in tackling governance shortcomings may be required where spatial divides 
are deep. A targeted approach that concentrates on a limited number of places to begin 
with is more realistic and credible than spreading expertise widely and thinly. National 
spatial strategies and arrangements to align sectoral policies and funding streams are also 
important. These and other policy recommendations need to be founded upon a much 
more substantial base of research and evidence. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Chapter two provides a review of the literature on 
spatial targeting. The third chapter examines the context of SA, including the changing 
spatial economy and historical evolution of national spatial policies. Chapter four analyses 
the history and contemporary experience of regional policies, from efforts to deconcentrate 
industry under apartheid to recent special economic zones. The fifth chapter focuses on 
national area-based policies post-apartheid, including schemes to develop township 
economies. Chapter six concludes by drawing the evidence together and reflecting on the 
wider implications for contemporary debates about spatial policies.  
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Chapter 2:  International experience and concepts of spatial policies 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Looking back over the history of spatial policies, and at the risk of over-simplification, it is 
possible to identify three broad approaches, each with a different rationale and character. 
Table 1 summarises their essential features. Spatial rebalancing aims to narrow the 
prosperity gap between regions, i.e. to promote economic convergence. The main 
mechanism is to steer productive investment and jobs from prosperous to poorer regions, 
and to attract foreign direct investment. Financial inducements are based on standard rules 
and eligibility criteria to ensure predictability and certainty for investors. Improvements in 
physical infrastructure also play a part in accommodating mobile manufacturing plants and 
other major projects. The short-run economic impacts are most important for policy-makers 
and firms benefit from the lower costs of doing business, such as labour and land.  
 
Table 1: Different Approaches to Spatial Policy 
 
 Spatial rebalancing Space-neutral Place-based 
Goals and 
objectives 
Narrow the prosperity 
gap between regions 
and reduce 
unemployment in 
poorer areas.  
Aggregate economic 
growth via 
agglomeration 
economies and 
economic integration. 
Each region develops to 
its potential by building 
a more durable and 
dynamic local economy. 
Mechanisms Steer investment and 
jobs from leading to 
lagging regions. 
Attract foreign direct 
investment. 
Facilitate economic 
density, scale 
economies and 
connectivity. 
Remove barriers to 
migration. 
Strengthen local assets, 
know-how and 
institutions.  
Develop more 
productive and 
innovative enterprises. 
Policy 
instruments 
Standard financial 
incentives.  
Improved physical 
infrastructure.  
Streamlined business 
regulations. 
People-focused public 
services.  
Connecting 
infrastructure. 
Deregulation to 
expand housing 
supply in fast-growing 
cities. 
Holistic and integrated 
strategies based on 
developing distinctive 
human capabilities and 
novel activities. 
Style of 
government 
Centralised and 
predictable.  
Special purpose 
agencies to expedite 
implementation. 
National institutions 
and universal 
programmes to meet 
the essential needs of 
people and firms. 
Responsive city and 
regional government. 
External partnerships.  
Multi-level governance.  
Economic 
rationale 
Static benefits of 
business relocation to 
lower cost regions. 
Possible reduction in 
overheating and 
Ongoing benefits to 
economic growth via 
the efficiency and 
productivity derived 
from agglomeration 
Dynamic benefits 
derived from local 
experimentation, 
learning, adaptation and 
differentiation. 
7 
 
congestion in core 
regions. 
economies. 
Social and 
political 
rationale 
Social solidarity and 
political stability. 
Popular acceptance of 
urbanisation and 
uneven development. 
Build strong and 
resilient foundations for 
shared and lasting 
prosperity. 
Where is the 
policy focus? 
Relatively poor regions 
and localities. 
Large cities. Every region and 
locality. 
Source: Authors’ creation 
 
The space-neutral approach aims to maximise aggregate growth through increased 
efficiency. It is assumed that an expanding economy will narrow spatial disparities by 
spreading income and investment from the buoyant core to surrounding regions. The logic 
is to facilitate economic concentration and economies of scale in a few big cities through 
labour migration and connecting infrastructure. Policy instruments are designed to respond 
to and reinforce these ‘natural’ processes by people-centred actions and urban 
infrastructure, rather than to steer business in contrary directions. The economic benefits 
are supposed to be more dynamic than from spatial rebalancing, and stem from the ongoing 
cost savings and productivity gains associated with economic density and agglomeration. 
The outcome is expected to be a higher rate of national growth and higher average incomes. 
 
The place-based approach is concerned with improving conditions in a wider group of 
regions by helping to realise their potential through development from within rather than 
transfers from elsewhere. The priority is to strengthen the distinctive assets, knowledge and 
human capabilities of each territory and support upgrading and diversification into new and 
more sophisticated activities. Policy instruments are tailored to the local context and geared 
to promoting indigenous enterprise and innovation through learning and collaboration. The 
economic benefits are derived from the emphasis on creativity, experimentation and 
differentiation, i.e. undertaking more complex tasks and enhancing the qualitative character 
of growth rather than more of the same. The ideal outcome is the emergence of a 
distinctive growth trajectory for each region so as to moderate zero-sum, or ‘head-to-head’, 
competition between regions. 
 
These are clearly generalisations that obscure variations within each policy concept and 
similarities between them. There are also distinctions between the spatial scales of different 
interventions that cut across the three approaches. Regional development policies tend to 
focus on the economic and infrastructure dimensions of development, while local, or area-
based, programmes stress the broader human development aspects, such as community 
well-being and living conditions. The logic is that regional policies relate more closely to 
functional economic units, particularly metropolitan labour markets or commuting 
catchment areas. Local development relates more closely to the scale of everyday life, 
including the territory covered by people’s immediate social networks and journeys to 
shopping, school or recreation. This distinction is not fixed and definitive, just as the 
differences between regional and area-based policies should not be exaggerated. 
 
2.2 Spatial rebalancing  
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The first generation of spatial policies was driven by social and political pressures to reduce 
the gap between rich and poor regions. The diversion of state resources was intended to 
demonstrate solidarity and promote national cohesion, as well as to improve material 
conditions in the target areas (Pike et al, 2017). A regional policy was introduced in the UK 
when heavy industries in the north were devastated by the Great Depression in the 1930s, 
causing mass unemployment and social unrest. Assisted Areas were designated within 
which companies could receive sizeable incentives from central government in return for 
creating and maintaining jobs. New industrial estates and advance factories were also built 
to attract mobile industry. In United States, a more comprehensive approach was followed 
in the Tennessee Valley, an agricultural region also damaged by the Depression. A 
government agency was established that invested heavily in infrastructure (e.g. electricity 
generation and flood control), technical support (e.g. developing and manufacturing 
fertilizers) and attracting new industries to the region. Italy introduced a regional policy in 
the 1950s to reduce poverty and stem out-migration from the depressed South of the 
country. It included major subsidies for industrial relocation and investment in new roads, 
irrigation schemes and other infrastructure. 
 
These policies sought to rebalance inequalities by transferring economic activity from 
affluent to poorer regions, and by stimulating demand in depressed regions, influenced by 
Keynesian economic ideas. The emphasis subsequently shifted in many countries to 
attracting foreign direct investment, using the same policy instruments. Following similar 
thinking, some countries sought to rebalance the national urban system by supporting the 
growth of secondary cities and towns in order to relieve congestion in the biggest cities 
(Parr, 1999). In all cases they relied on large financial transfers between regions 
orchestrated by central government. In many countries there were physical controls placed 
on firms in the prosperous areas intended to restrict their expansion and spur them to shift 
activities to less-favoured regions. Manufacturing plants were the focus of attention 
because of their perceived locational mobility. Manufacturing also comprised more manual 
occupations than services, which helped to absorb unemployment among less-skilled 
workers. Constructing infrastructure was also labour-intensive and provided an additional 
stimulus to job creation. 
 
A major criticism was the somewhat uninspired nature of this approach, which often failed 
to engender self-sustaining growth (Barca et al., 2012; Pike et al., 2017). The new activity 
rarely became anchored in the region and did little to overcome structural rigidities and 
obsolescence. It encouraged investment in the region, rather than all-round development 
and transformation of the region, i.e. a narrow sectoral rather than a broader territorial 
emphasis. The same policy formula was followed in different places, and generally managed 
by central government to ensure consistency. Beneficiaries were often mature assembly 
plants or branch factories seeking state subsidies, but lacking product design, marketing or 
other value adding functions. Little technology or know-how were transferred to the region 
and few spillovers were generated. The new jobs were secure as long as the factories 
operated efficiently, product sales were healthy and the subsidies were sustained. Yet the 
strategic capabilities and skill-sets to conduct their own research, development or marketing 
for the next generation of products were missing. It was difficult for less-favoured regions to 
modernise without the entrepreneurial, technological and financial competencies to build 
companies with their own products, processes and services. 
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There were various economic justifications provided for this approach. One argument for 
redirecting activity to depressed regions was to offset overheating and congestion in the 
labour and housing markets of the core region (Kaldor, 1970; Armstrong and Taylor, 2000). 
Decentralisation would reduce inflationary pressures and enable interest rates to be 
lowered, which would benefit the whole economy. Another argument was that economic 
and political power was concentrated in the leading region and draining the rest of the 
country of vital human and financial resources (McCann, 2016). These ideas were never fully 
accepted in most countries. For example, in 1983 the UK government famously declared 
that there was no economic case for regional policy.1 The size of the incentives and eligible 
regions were promptly scaled down. There was a parallel concern within Europe about ever-
increasing state subsidies being extracted by major corporations playing regions off against 
each other, or being misused by governments to protect domestic industries from external 
competition (Turok, 2004).  
 
Meanwhile, research within a political economy tradition suggested that regional policy was 
reinforcing tendencies within multinationals to disaggregate their various functions and 
separate them physically across regions in a new spatial division of labour (Massey, 1995). It 
made business sense for them to locate their routine production in lower cost, peripheral 
areas, especially with the available incentives. However, the additional jobs often proved 
transient because the plants lacked the wherewithal to adapt to changing market 
conditions, or could be induced to move elsewhere by more generous incentives. The 
pursuit of a ‘quick-fix’ also meant that little was done to spur the formation and growth of 
new, locally-based enterprises. 
 
A different case was made for targeting particular industries within the lagging regions. 
‘Growth poles’ were about implanting propulsive industries that would generate large 
multiplier effects because of their backward and forward linkages. Having a focal point on 
which to concentrate investment and services would be more efficient and have a bigger 
catalytic effect than spreading the effort throughout the region. This concept was influential 
in many parts of the world from around the 1960s, although it never lived up to its promise 
(Storper, 1991; Parr 1999). Identifying the key industries in advance was a difficulty. 
Pursuing a concerted strategy to build constellations of firms around them was another 
problem. As a result, the transplanted operations developed few local linkages and 
remained ‘cathedrals in the desert’ (Hardy, 1998). In several developing countries, the drive 
to launch new capital cities, and to shift the locus of power from the coast to the interior, 
were justified on the basis that this would stimulate the economy of neglected regions, in 
line with a simple version of growth pole theory. However, the new urban centres ended up 
mostly accommodating state administrative functions and the wider economic impacts 
were negligible (Cain, 2014). Many turned out to be expensive mistakes that diverted 
substantial resources from more valuable economic and social projects elsewhere (Parnell 
and Simon, 2014). Nevertheless, the idea of using the physical presence of government to 
stimulate regional growth was an important principle with potential for more creative 
                                                          
1
 Such arguments have re-emerged in recent years following the widening of the North-South divide (Martin, 
2015; McCann, 2016). The point being made is that the UK’s recent growth has been based on too narrow a 
foundation of a few industries in a few regions, namely London and the South-East. This is unstable and 
wasteful of talent and resources in other regions. 
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application. It has resurfaced in the UK recently in recognition that the highly centralised 
system of government spending and political control militates against places outside London 
and acts as a ‘counter-regional policy’ (Martin, 2015; McCann, 2016). 
 
The concepts of free trade zones, export processing zones and enterprise zones differ from 
growth poles in their less discriminating approach to industrial selection. These special 
economic zones (SEZs) date back at least 50 years and have become increasingly popular 
around the world (Farole, 2011). Rather than target a few sectors for priority attention, they 
embrace a range of activities that fulfil certain minimum requirements, such as having a 
high export content. Their focus on particular localities enables investment in modern 
infrastructure to be concentrated in places with better growth prospects than the rest of 
the region, such as seaports and airports. Hence some of them should probably not be 
classified under the spatial rebalancing rubric. Their restricted geographical focus 
establishes a ‘special’ status, including streamlined regulations, extra financial benefits, 
enhanced logistics and greater visibility for decision-makers. 
 
China has considerable experience of using SEZs to stimulate large-scale industrialisation. 
Sleepy coastal towns and fishing villages such as Shenzhen enjoyed inherent geographical 
advantages when they were designated as priority locations to start manufacturing export 
goods during the 1980s. The combination of simplified procedures, special tax breaks, 
exemptions from customs duties and large reserves of low cost migrant labour proved 
enormously attractive to foreign investment and launched China’s remarkable 
transformation from an agrarian society (Miller, 2012; OECD, 2013; World Bank, 2014). The 
special attributes of SEZs were reinvented over time as new areas were designated in order 
to give them a distinctive character and novel advantages over other areas. China designed 
SEZ regimes that were tailored to the context in which they were introduced and integrated 
into wider economic strategies. The state’s commitment to bold experimentation meant 
piloting far-reaching reforms of national regulations to maximise the impact of SEZs.  
 
A similar determination to adapt zone regimes to their particular regional circumstances and 
deliberately learn from the experience has not been apparent to the same extent 
elsewhere. Consequently, SEZs have generated very mixed results around the world (Farole, 
2011). The globalisation of trade and investment, enabled by the disaggregation of 
manufacturing into global production networks and value chains, has been an important 
trend in their favour. Against this has been a tendency to see SEZs as separate initiatives or 
privileged enclaves, rather than part of broader economic transformation strategies 
covering skills development, regional clusters and supply chains, and public-private 
partnerships.  
  
Spatial targeting took on a quite different, more localised form in many advanced 
economies from around the 1960s with the discovery of areas of concentrated poverty in 
the inner cities of large industrial conurbations. Many governments in Europe and the US 
became more concerned with treating social and environmental problems in run-down 
neighbourhoods than with steering growth (Oakley and Tsao, 2006; Cochrane, 2007; 
Musterd and Ostendorf, 2008). Intensified international competition and under-investment 
were causing many factory closures and leading to vacant and derelict land and buildings. 
Working class communities were most vulnerable to the job losses and experienced rising 
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poverty and exclusion from the rest of society (Wilson, 1997; Jargowsky, 1997). There were 
social protests and street riots in many European and US cities as governments seemed to 
retreat from their post-War commitment to full employment, and as households slipped 
through the safety net of the welfare state. Immigration from the former colonies 
contributed to an atmosphere of racial tension and mistrust.  
 
The threat to national stability and political legitimacy forced a government response, 
especially as local authorities found it difficult to skew their stretched resources towards 
poorer districts. In the UK the Urban Programme was launched and the US equivalent was 
called the War on Poverty. The focus was on marginalised neighbourhoods suffering from 
multiple deprivation and social stress, including low income, poor education, sub-standard 
housing, ill-health, family breakdown and rising crime. Extra resources were provided to 
enhance local schools, health facilities, social services and policing. Joint working was 
encouraged between teachers, social workers, health officials, police officers and other 
professionals to treat the problems faced by poor families is a more holistic way. Many area-
based initiatives also made efforts to involve communities in decision-making through local 
partnerships, and to introduce new approaches to social regeneration through community-
based organisations.  
 
Yet there was a tendency to perceive local problems independently of the economy or 
public policy more generally. Urban policy was treated as a special instrument designed to 
address selected aspects of under-performance within poor neighbourhoods. It offered 
some compensation for their economic problems and for the inability of mainstream 
policies to ensure community well-being. However, there was little attempt to address the 
structural and systemic causes of poverty by rebuilding local economies and creating jobs. 
Observers criticised area-based projects for being too fragmented, reactive and neglectful of 
sustainable solutions (Cochrane, 2007; Musterd and Ostendorf, 2008; Syrett and North, 
2008; Turok, 2008; Lawless, 2012). At worst they merely ameliorated poor living conditions, 
instead of being catalysts for socio-economic development. There wasn’t the political 
appetite to test more radical policy reforms or to deliver solutions at anything like the scale 
of the SEZs in China. 
 
Some forms of area-based targeting also focused on physical structures, including the 
condition of the housing stock, derelict land and buildings. Run-down areas were perceived 
to encourage anti-social behaviour and to deter private investment. Damp and decaying 
housing was linked with ill-health, insecurity and other social problems. Improvements in 
physical structures were highly visible and relatively easy for governments to engineer. This 
helps to explain the higher levels of support for physical renewal and investment in bricks 
and mortar. The assumption was that improved liveability would stabilise communities and 
reduce the social malaise. Yet independent research questioned the social and economic 
benefits of physical improvements in the absence of broader economic progress and deeper 
social reforms (Lupton, 2003; van Gent et al., 2009; Lawless, 2011). Furthermore, well-
located neighbourhoods were prone to gentrification as they were upgraded and existing 
residents were displaced by better-off incomers. 
 
There was a broader concern that urban initiatives treated places in isolation, neglecting the 
regional context and interactions with surrounding districts (Wilson, 1997; Jargowsky, 1997). 
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They were inward-looking and didn’t do enough to connect residents with wider 
opportunities (Andersson and Musterd, 2005; Syrett and North, 2008; Turok and Robson; 
2007). There was insufficient attention paid to the sequencing of actions and mitigation of 
gentrification. Rather like traditional regional policy, there was an implicit assumption 
among senior decision-makers that urban policy was zero-sum (merely concerned with 
shuffling resources and opportunities between areas), with no impact on national prosperity 
(Turok, 2008). The lack of a clearly articulated economic rationale consistently held back 
government support. The outcome was many short-term, piecemeal initiatives promoted by 
separate agencies, often with unwarranted fanfare. This precluded a more integrated 
approach, including stronger links between urban and regional policies, and across the 
social and economic dimensions of development.  
 
2.3 The space-neutral approach  
 
A space-neutral perspective emerged partly because of the difficulties facing redistributive 
spatial policies in a more competitive global environment with stressed public finances. 
Mobile capital and talent made it more difficult to anchor private investment within 
territories and threatened escalating public subsidies as governments bid for investment 
and sacrificed environmental and welfare standards in a ‘race to the bottom’. There were 
growing criticisms that scarce taxpayer funds were being wasted on unviable projects in 
places with little prospect of self-sustaining development, given how easy it is for 
governments to throw money at symbolic initiatives. They lack the knowledge or foresight 
to anticipate the myriad individual decisions that genuinely shape spatial outcomes. Some 
economists also argued that balanced or equitable development is misguided because 
growth is inevitably uneven and driven by powerful market forces which cannot be reversed 
(Cheshire et al., 2014). The World Bank (2009) pointedly criticised the EU’s regional policy 
on the grounds that it promoted dispersed rather than concentrated development, thereby 
undermining productivity and innovation, and depressing growth.  
 
The World Development Report (WDR) (World Bank, 2009) put forward a clear alternative 
to spatial targeting. It advocated a ‘spatially-blind’ or ‘place-neutral’ approach, i.e. policies 
that apply to all locations. These focus on meeting the essential needs of households, such 
as clean water, sanitation, energy, healthcare and education. These ‘people-centred’ 
policies ensure that the fate of individuals is not determined by where they happen to be 
born, because they acquire the capabilities to get jobs elsewhere. The outcome will be 
efficient and equitable because people will move to the most productive places, thereby 
reducing unemployment in their original areas and satisfying the increasing demand for 
labour at their destinations. This spatial ‘adjustment’ mechanism is said to operate relatively 
smoothly and freely. Urbanisation reinforces agglomeration economies and thereby fuels 
productivity, knowledge creation and aggregate growth, in line with the New Economic 
Geography paradigm (Glaeser, 2011; World Bank, 2013; Glaeser and Joshi-Ghani, 2013).  
 
There is a secondary role for public policy to enable the expansion of the most successful 
cities by removing bottlenecks and barriers. This means responding to growth pressures as 
they emerge. For example, land-use planning controls that restrict the supply of housing 
should be relaxed (Cheshire et al., 2014). New investment is also required to expand the 
transport network and other urban infrastructure. In due course cities will grow to a point 
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where the diseconomies of scale exceed the advantages. This will lead naturally to 
deconcentration as core costs escalate and constraints on labour supply and land prompt 
firms to relocate to secondary cities and towns. The centripetal forces of concentration will 
in due course generate centrifugal tendencies to disperse activity. It is futile to try and 
revive former industrial cities or to tackle physical dereliction and decay in run-down areas. 
People matter not places, and people are mobile, so they should be the focus of support. 
The fair way to do this is through universal education, health and other welfare services 
(World Bank, 2009). These promote national cohesion and social stability because everyone 
benefits, whereas spatial policies are divisive because they favour some communities over 
others. 
 
The central argument of the WDR is that economic growth is inevitably unbalanced, but it 
can still be inclusive (World Bank, 2009). Inclusive growth can be attained through economic 
integration of leading and lagging regions, which enables trade, resource transfers and 
migration. A similar logic applies to inequalities within cities. Run-down and deprived 
neighbourhoods reflect the sorting effects of the housing market (Cheshire et al., 2014). 
People with low skills are susceptible to unemployment and end up living in areas with the 
lowest quality, least desirable housing. The appropriate solution is to improve their skills so 
they can compete more effectively in the labour market, not to spend large sums trying to 
revitalise the parts of the city in which they live. Targeting districts for enterprise and 
economic development will simply mean that jobs get displaced from neighbouring areas, 
with no reduction in local unemployment and at substantial public cost (Einiö and Overman, 
2016). 
 
The WDR also advocates growth policies at regional, national and international levels (see 
also, World Bank, 2013). The priority is to create spatially-blind institutions, including 
universal public services and laws to ensure efficient land and labour markets. As growth 
takes off and urban centres emerge, transport and communications infrastructure is needed 
to connect places and facilitate agglomeration and economic specialisation. Spatial 
targeting policy (benefitting a specific area) should only be introduced much later on to 
tackle the most intractable localised problems. It should be “used sparingly since this is 
where misallocation is most likely” (Deichmann et al., 2011, p.167). Spatial targeting is only 
recommended for highly-urbanised countries with very divided cities and large regional 
disparities (World Bank, 2009).  
 
The message for low and middle income countries is that regional inequalities are inevitable 
since growth focuses on a few places with inherent advantages. Yet with access to decent 
schools, health facilities and other public goods, less-developed regions will catch up and 
poverty will fall. These market-driven transitions take time and require patient people-
centred policies. There is no alternative since special economic zones, big infrastructure 
projects and other ‘quick fixes’ are likely to become white elephants. Policies that siphon off 
resources and jobs from dynamic cities will dampen aggregate growth by undermining 
agglomeration, reducing productivity and depriving urban economies of the public 
investment they need to fuel further expansion. 
 
Several criticisms can be levelled at this analysis. First, the space-neutral approach assumes 
that most government policies have uniform geographical impacts, despite evidence to the 
14 
 
contrary. Many policies that are supposed to be spatially-blind have unequal impacts and 
outcomes because of differences in the conditions of implementation between areas, 
especially human capital and institutions. The delivery of effective schools, clinics and basic 
services all depend on capable local authorities staffed by competent professionals. This 
cannot be taken for granted in less-developed regions. National innovation policies have 
very uneven impacts because the capacity of firms and universities to absorb this support 
varies greatly between regions (Morgan, 2016). Major government facilities are located 
disproportionately in big cities because recruiting scarce skills is much easier. Military 
spending, strategic installations and national research institutes also have unequal impacts. 
These differences tend to accumulate over time and reinforce spatial divisions, unless 
deliberate efforts are made to offset and reverse them (Martin, 2015; McCann, 2016). 
 
Second, a space-neutral approach is unequivocal about the gains from economic integration 
between regions. It assumes that trade and factor mobility are equalising forces. This 
neglects historic evidence that if places have unequal endowments at the outset, connecting 
them may enlarge spatial inequalities (Armstrong and Taylor, 2000; Pike et al., 2017). 
Dominant regions may draw resources from poorer areas and pull further ahead. 
Compensating transfers could be outweighed by a widening division of labour between 
them. Local economies dominated by low value activities face systemic barriers that hamper 
upgrading. Spatial inequalities may be cumulative, with divergence more likely than catch-
up (Amin et al, 2003; Martin, 2015). Similar points apply within cities, where enclaves of 
concentrated poverty may persist without countervailing interventions. Perhaps the key 
point is that an exclusive policy focus on people is likely to widen the differences between 
places, because of the sorting effects of people with different incomes choosing where they 
live and leaving less-advantaged groups behind, trapped in exclusionary spaces. 
 
Third, the approach is underpinned by a simple causal model which holds that urbanisation 
in low income countries accelerates industrialisation, which raises productivity, creates 
wealth and reduces poverty. Because cities are engines of growth, the bigger they are, the 
better for prosperity (Wojan, 2016). Over time the benefits extend outwards to the 
periphery and spatial gaps are reduced. There is a kind of law-like, physical determinism to 
this way of thinking that ignores the diversity of regional economies and trajectories. 
Countries, regions and cities do not follow the same historic growth paths. Evidence from 
around the world shows that the relationship between urbanisation and development is 
also highly variable and that cities do not necessarily drive prosperity (OECD, 2006; McCann 
and Acs, 2011; Turok and McGranahan, 2013). Local and national circumstances determine 
how urbanisation unfolds and the balance between its positive and negative effects. City-
level planning is vital in anticipating and preparing for growth by coordinating business, 
household and public infrastructure investment decisions to ensure a coherent urban form.  
 
To sum up, economists’ recognition of geography’s contribution to development is an 
important shift from the previous blind spot. However, the space-neutral approach neglects 
the influence of local institutions, the qualitative character of growth, and the enduring 
economic imbalances between places. These realities complicate the notion that cities 
naturally fuel inclusive economic growth. Government policy is given a circumscribed role, 
with undue faith in the ability of market forces to reduce inequalities.  
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2.4 Place-based policies  
 
Recognition of the pitfalls of relying on external resources to revitalise regional economies 
has prompted serious reflection by the EU, OECD and other organisations (Barca, 2009; 
OECD, 2006, 2009). The emerging policies have been influenced by the concepts of 
endogenous growth, human capital, knowledge-based economies and institutions (Barca et 
al., 2012; Pike et al., 2017). Place-based policy contrasts with the non-interventionist stance 
of the space-neutral approach and traditional top-down spatial policies. There is an 
assumption that governments can influence local economic trajectories if their policies are 
carefully-designed and well-executed by resourceful, competent and accountable 
institutions (Morgan, 2016). Regional and local identities also matter, implying that 
particular places and communities cannot be left behind in the pursuit of narrow ideologies. 
 
A fundamental pillar of the place-based approach is that development strategies should be 
tailored to and embedded within their geographical context (Barca, 2009; OECD, 2009). 
Neglecting contextual diversity is a serious criticism of previous models. Place-based policies 
should build upon local capabilities and resource endowments in seeking to grow and 
branch out into new directions. Local assets and know-how provide the foundation on 
which jobs, incomes and prosperity are most likely to be sustained, but they also need long-
term investment, upgrading and injection of fresh ideas and techniques to undertake more 
complex tasks over time. Space and location shape the development possibilities of 
particular territories and the life chances of individuals. The spatial context matters in ways 
that go well beyond physical geography and natural resources. Social, cultural and 
institutional characteristics (such as the quality of regulations, government capacity, local 
leadership and learning capabilities) also have a bearing on the rate and character of 
economic development (Barca et al., 2012; Morgan, 2016).  
 
Strategies should address the distinctive growth constraints facing different places, and aim 
to utilise and enhance unique local attributes, untapped knowledge and ideas, and other 
under-employed resources. Regions may have geographical advantages that could be 
exploited more effectively, such as a gateway location, regional service centre or tourist 
attraction. Astute development organisations may be able to improve or develop the 
market by raising finance to provide patient risk capital, support long-term business 
decisions, or stimulate productive activity in forms that would not occur spontaneously. 
They may be able to facilitate the diffusion of knowledge and technology, and align the skills 
and competences required by business with those supplied by colleges and universities. 
These tasks require integrated approaches rather than narrow sectoral programmes, 
piecemeal incentives or discrete pieces of infrastructure. This also necessitates governments 
making the spatial dimension of their policies and investment priorities more explicit (Barca, 
2009).   
 
A second principle of the place-based approach is that decision-making should not be left to 
narrow local interests. National policies and templates are unlikely to be responsive to local 
conditions because central government is too distant and distracted by other matters. Yet 
local decision-making is vulnerable to parochialism and elite capture, or wedded to the past. 
Selected local interests may engage in opportunistic behaviour at the expense of the 
majority. Urban land is particularly susceptible to speculation and other forms of rent-
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seeking that inhibit coherent development. Established property owners may resist 
additional housing or industrial development in their areas out of self-interest. Elected 
leaders may be preoccupied with short-term, partisan agendas and factional conflicts. The 
ideas of partnership, collaboration and mutual accountability can reduce some of these 
risks. 
 
In addition, some of the knowledge and technology required for local development is not 
readily available and must be produced by consulting external actors. Successful 
development needs decision-making to be open to new insights, and based on dialogue and 
debate (Barca et al., 2012). Openness to external inputs can help to prevent insularity and 
cosy consensus. Engaging diverse stakeholders across the business sector, civil society and 
government can resolve problems, build confidence and harness wider expertise and 
networks. Different constellations of commercial, technical and political interests need to 
generate shared understandings as a foundation for investing their resources and know-how 
in local development (Morgan, 2016). This requires cooperation and coordination of 
different policies, organisations and actors in pursuing an agreed strategic agenda, and 
perhaps even a social contract. Promoting common values, building partnerships and 
encouraging a sense of shared destiny and community can also reduce opportunism and 
speculation. 
 
Multi-level planning, decision-making and co-financing are also important to enable local, 
regional and national perspectives to be factored into policy choices. National and regional 
authorities can provide resources and technical support for local capacity building. They can 
set parameters governing how public funds are spent, in order to prevent wasteful 
competition, duplication of effort and malpractice (Barca, 2011; Tomaney, 2013; Boschma, 
2014). They may inject new insights and advice on practical policy instruments from 
development experience elsewhere into the local process. External authorities can also 
provide checks and balances to improve transparency and accountability to citizens, to 
bolster civic leadership and to build investor confidence. Lastly, there is an important role 
for multi-level arrangements to enhance national understanding of local conditions in order 
to sensitise their policies to needs on the ground.  
 
Of course multi-level governance and cross-sector coordination are difficult to achieve 
because policy fragmentation and compartmentalised working are deep-seated in public 
bureaucracies worldwide. Two ways of reducing these divisions are through transversal 
area-based or issue-based institutional arrangements. Either can provide a strategic 
framework and intermediary bodies that - over time - bring greater coherence to a range of 
sectoral policies, instruments and initiatives so that they complement and reinforce each 
other. The packaging of different interventions creates synergies which enhance their 
individual contributions. It is difficult enough to shift the trajectory of a local economy 
without policies contradicting each other. Priorities are bound to vary in different localities 
depending on the existing level of cooperation, the quality of local institutions and the 
nature of the challenges faced. 
 
Recognition that institutions matter for development means that physical geography and 
urban size cannot determine locational performance on their own. Smaller cities are not 
necessarily less productive than big cities, and mega-cities can be particularly difficult to 
17 
 
govern (OECD, 2006; Dijkstra et al., 2013). Large and small cities may both underperform 
because of inertia or vested interests holding them back. Governments should not neglect 
smaller cities and towns, but rather engage with local institutions to increase their impact. 
One starting point is to tackle physical impediments or bureaucratic constraints that hinder 
investment. Trying to identify specialised activities in which localities are best suited is also 
worthwhile. This requires building on local capabilities and supporting innovative ideas by 
combining insights from different actors. Unlocking the potential of all cities and regions will 
contribute more to national prosperity than focusing on a few big cities (Farole et al., 2011; 
Wojan, 2016). 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
Tackling uneven development is more difficult in a highly competitive and volatile global 
economy subject to technological disruptions, migration pressures, constraints on public 
investment and popular disaffection. Decision-makers face many complex dilemmas about 
whether to target people or places; to focus on areas of greatest need or development 
potential; to build on existing economic structures or branch out in new directions; to 
promote change from the centre or assist initiatives to emerge from the grassroots; and to 
plan for the future or respond to market processes. Spatial policies have gradually shifted 
over time from steering investment through fixed incentives and hard infrastructure, 
towards growing from within by developing local assets and know-how. Some observers 
advocate a space-neutral approach, in which the priority is to target poor people and 
improve their capabilities, thereby playing down territorial differences. Others favour a 
place-based approach, in which localities pursue their development potential by investing in 
under-used resources. The former assumes that governments are weak and make poor 
economic development decisions. The latter assumes that governments can acquire the 
capabilities to shape economic outcomes. The place-based approach is newer and less easy 
to define because it combines different policy mechanisms, depending on local economic 
and social realities. There is a surprising lack of robust empirical research to evaluate the 
validity of many of these arguments and propositions. 
 
Chapter 3: Spatial Inequalities and Policies in South Africa 
3.1. Introduction 
The territory of SA is one of the most unequal and visibly polarised in the world (NPC, 2012). 
For many years spatial divisions were deliberately engineered and often brutally imposed. 
Geographical disparities originally arose from the way in which colonial institutions and 
practices exploited the country’s natural resources. The indigenous black African2 
population was forced into rural reserves and their access to urban livelihoods was strictly 
                                                          
2 The use of racial categories in this paper reflects prevalent realities in South Africa, and is not 
meant to condone them.  The apartheid categories were ‘white’ (people of European descent), 
‘coloured’ (people of ‘mixed race’), ‘Asian’ or ‘Indian’ (people of Asian descent) and ‘black’ (people 
of African descent). In this paper, the term ‘black’ is used to refer to people of African and Asian 
origin and those of ‘mixed race’, while the term ‘black African’ refers only to people of African 
descent, following current Census classifications. 
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controlled. Residential segregation policies created racially-divided cities and towns, with 
unequal access to jobs and amenities. From 1948 the apartheid government enlarged these 
spatial fractures through laws imposing separate urban development and establishing the 
rural reserves as self-governing, ethnically-defined homelands, or ‘bantustans’. Entire 
communities were forcibly removed off prime urban land and relocated to peripheral areas. 
Land and space were used as cruel instruments of social separation and subjugation. 
Industrial decentralisation policies were introduced to create jobs in and around the 
bantustans in order to contain migration pressures and thereby keep people of different 
races apart. The logic resembled spatial rebalancing in that efforts were made to steer 
mobile manufacturing plants from the cities towards these locations.  
The first democratic government elected in 1994 was faced with a stagnant economy, a 
fiscal crisis, entrenched social and spatial inequalities, and a high risk of political instability. 
Economic activity was concentrated in the metropolitan areas, but almost half the black 
African population lived in and around the bantustans with sparse opportunities. The 
government faced an agonising choice - whether to support private investment and 
employment growth where it was already established (in line with space-neutral ideas), or 
to promote redress and redistribution by favouring development in marginalised areas. In 
practice, it has generally eschewed this dilemma and its spatial policy has been ambiguous 
as a result. This partly reflects suspicions about spatial policy following the deplorable 
practices of the past, along with the all-encompassing framework of the ruling party, with its 
assorted values, factions, interest groups and patronage networks. The weak systems of 
long-term planning and coordination within government are also responsible for this 
predicament (NPC, 2012).  
As a result, places have been treated reasonably even-handedly in terms of investment in 
economic infrastructure. In contrast, expenditure on most social programmes has been 
skewed towards rural areas, reflecting higher levels of poverty and need for public services 
(see below). There has been no explicit policy towards rural-urban migration or the 
management of urbanisation. In addition, urban land, space and location have been dealt 
with in a much more passive and reactive manner than under apartheid. A range of spatial 
programmes have been introduced, but in a fragmented and inconsistent way. The 
government’s broadly neutral stance towards SA’s territory has avoided the serious 
dislocation and damage to communities inflicted in the past, and ensured basic social 
stability. Yet there has been no sustained effort to rectify or reengineer the spatial legacy of 
systematic exclusion, or to shift the path-dependent pattern of economic growth towards, 
say, a more employment-intensive trajectory (Bhorat and Mayet, 2013; Black, 2016). 
Indeed, some sectoral policies, such as free housing, have paradoxically exacerbated 
inherited spatial divisions by confining poor households to cheap peripheral land. They have 
therefore reinforced the burden of an ‘apartheid tax’ imposed on poor black households. 
In the absence of an overarching rationale and policy framework, spatial initiatives have had 
various objectives, including attracting private investment, steering state spending, 
encouraging local enterprise and improving public services. There has also been an ongoing 
debate between advocates of a space-neutral position (implying a focus on big cities) and 
proponents of various forms of spatial targeting (including more concerted programmes 
focused on rural areas or urban townships). In the vacuum of national spatial policy, 
particular initiatives have emerged through advocacy by specific groups and individuals 
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within or close to government. They have been influenced both by international ideas and 
domestic experiences. Many programmes have taken on hybrid forms in practice, including 
elements of spatial rebalancing and a place-based approach. There has been considerable 
experimentation, with much to learn from the accumulated experience, both positive and 
negative.  
This chapter provides an overview of the SA context, examining the evolution of uneven 
development and contemporary trends. It also considers how the debate over spatial policy 
has changed in the apartheid and post-apartheid eras. Subsequent chapters examine the 
range of explicit spatial policies in more detail. 
3.2. From Colonialism to Apartheid 
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the spatial economy developed around 
Dutch and British colonialism centred on seaports, agriculture, trade, administration and 
military activities in a few large towns linked to a network of smaller centres. The discovery 
of gold in the late nineteenth century shifted the focus to Johannesburg and its hinterland 
(now Gauteng province), which quickly became the dominant economic hub. In subsequent 
decades, major reinvestment and economic diversification occurred within the same region, 
as a few powerful corporations established manufacturing, banking and other tertiary 
activities linked to mining (Harrison and Zack, 2012). This commanding nexus became 
consolidated as a ‘mineral-energy complex’ (Fine and Rustomjee, 1996) that dominated the 
entire national economy, buttressed by very considerable state support. Although industrial 
diversification occurred during the twentieth century, ownership and control of the 
economy remained highly concentrated, with four conglomerates controlling the lion’s 
share of economic activity in 1994 (Philip et al., 2014; Black, 2016).   
The growth of mining also created powerful pressures that undermined the black African 
peasantry and reinforced uneven development. Black Africans had previously been forced 
into waged labour on farms, but the growing demand for labour on the mines led to more 
draconian measures (Turok, 2014). The 1913 Land Act laid the basis for spatial segregation 
by confining the black African population to only 13% of the land. This marginalised peasant 
agriculture and removed competition with white farmers, thereby forcing black Africans into 
waged labour. Men migrated to the mines on a temporary basis, while their families 
remained in the reserves. This helped to keep wages low and boosted profits, although 
conditions in the reserves soon deteriorated from overpopulation on unproductive land. 
The 1923 Native Urban Areas Act cast black Africans as temporary sojourners in the towns 
and strengthened influx controls, thereby reinforcing the cheap migrant labour system. It 
also introduced the idea of residential segregation of different racial groups by preventing 
black Africans from purchasing or renting land in white areas.  
From the mid-1920s, a new government representing white working class and agricultural 
interests instituted measures to promote industrialisation and elevate the position of poor 
whites and Afrikaners. It put in place import substitution programmes and created a group 
of state-owned enterprises, particularly in sectors linked to the mineral-energy complex, 
such as iron, steel, chemicals and electricity. Subsequent governments extended these 
policies and established an Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) to accelerate 
industrialisation. The focus of these largely-successful endeavours was on national 
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economic development. There was no consideration given to regional policy until the 1940s, 
despite the hardship and deteriorating living conditions in the reserves.  
Controls on the movement of black Africans to the cities began to break down during the 
1940s, and the Smuts coalition government began to explore alternatives. Rapid 
industrialisation, rising urban wages and strong migration pressures prompted a range of 
public bodies to advocate industrial dispersal from the cities. Several government councils 
investigated the desirability of regional policies as a way of limiting black African 
urbanisation. However, the reports were equivocal and industrialists argued for freer 
population movement to the cities to meet their increasing demand for labour. The IDC 
established several projects in rural areas, close to natural resources or sources of labour, 
but most of its investments were in urban areas (Glaser, 1987). Hence prior to 1948, 
regional policy was limited and very piecemeal. 
 
Figure 1: Former Homelands, Current Provinces and Metropolitan Municipalities 
A new Nationalist government was elected in 1948, representing the interests of the white 
working class, white agriculture and Afrikaner business. It introduced the oppressive 
apartheid system and extended race-based spatial policies, including the elaborate system 
of bantustans, tough influx controls regulated through pass laws, and segregated 
neighbourhoods. Most bantustans were isolated from the main economic centres (Figure 1), 
although several bordered on large cities and towns such as Durban, Pretoria and East 
London. This created fragmented settlement patterns with long distances between places of 
home and work. Within cities and towns, racial segregation was imposed by law and 
separate residential areas known as ‘townships’ were created for black Africans, coloureds 
and Indians, generally on the edge of cities. Some three million people who did not fit the 
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blueprint were forcibly removed from urban areas or evicted from ‘white’ farms (Turok, 
2014). Townships were developed as dormitory spaces through large public housing 
projects, with limited low-order retail and social facilities and basic public services. Black 
African entrepreneurship was restricted by the state, even in these areas. Influx controls 
were intensified to limit access by black Africans to towns and cities and the number of 
people arrested for pass law offences increased to about 750,000 a year by the mid-1960s.  
Regional policy in the form of industrial decentralisation was used to support apartheid 
from 1960, although it had additional objectives as well, as the following chapter explains. 
The 1975 National Physical Development Plan was the country’s first spatial plan. It was 
based on a spatial rebalancing kind of logic, couched within the language of growth poles 
and growth centres. These policies had several important effects, although the departments 
dealing with regional policy were relatively weak within government (Oranje and Merrifield, 
2010), and their efforts were overshadowed by more powerful processes. For example, 
national economic policy gave top priority to import substitution, which tended to reinforce 
the concentration of industrial activity in the major centres, where the main markets for 
consumer products and intermediate goods were located.    
Economic growth began to slow in the late 1960s, reflecting deteriorating international 
conditions and the internal contradictions of apartheid, including skill shortages and thin 
local markets (Gelb, 1991). SA’s race-based regime impeded adjustment to a more dynamic 
growth path founded upon higher productivity and superior skills (Bhorat et al., 2014). As 
material circumstances in the bantustans worsened, many black Africans devised ways of 
moving to the cities, and popular resistance to the apartheid system increased. The state 
responded with a series of ‘reforms’, including stronger attempts to steer jobs to the 
homelands. This did not quell the political opposition, and mounting economic problems 
eventually brought about the collapse of apartheid, ushering in extended negotiations for 
change. After two decades of economic contraction, international sanctions and organised 
opposition at home and abroad, the ruling National Party accepted a negotiated transition 
to democracy. Many authors have argued that this settlement gave excessive concessions to 
established economic interests, which prevented more far-reaching social progress in 
subsequent years (Hart, 2013; Philip et al., 2014; Habib, 2013; Bundy, 2014). The counter-
argument is that the economy was in serious trouble, civil war was possible and there was a 
risk of large-scale capital flight. The key point is that the circumstances of the 1990s political 
transition had a sizeable influence on the trajectory of the spatial economy in the following 
decades.  
3.3. The Spatial Economy and Settlement Patterns in 1994 
The first democratic government inherited a very depressed economy with extraordinary 
levels of unemployment and extensive poverty. Concentrated ownership of capital and 
know-how, a narrow economic base and relatively capital- and energy-intensive heavy 
industry coincided with low productivity, limited innovation, poor international 
competitiveness and flat-lining employment levels (Bhorat et al., 2014; Black, 2016). SA was 
one of the most unequal countries in the world. Some 90-95% of wealth was owned by 10% 
of the population and highly racialized (Philip et al., 2014; Orthofer, 2016). Stark social 
inequalities were reflected in deep spatial disparities etched into the landscape of cities and 
regions.  
22 
 
One symptom was a major disjuncture between the location of the population and jobs. 
Some 43% of black Africans still lived in the former bantustans, where formal economic 
activity was sparse (Harrison, 2013; Turok, 2014). More than half (57%) of economic output 
(Gross Value Added (GVA)) and 52% of jobs were generated in the main metropolitan areas, 
where only 34% of people lived (Turok and Borel-Saladin, 2013). Three-quarters of rural 
households were destitute and depended on state social grants and family remittances from 
the cities for survival. Public infrastructure and service levels were also seriously deficient in 
the bantustans, which had suffered from weak and often corrupt governing institutions 
(Chipkin and Meny-Gibert, 2011).  
Looking in more detail, several bantustans were linked to selected cities. In addition, 
accelerating urbanisation meant rising poverty and hardship in urban areas (Turok and 
Borel-Saladin, 2014). Harrison (2013) captured this diversity by dividing the spatial economy 
into three categories. An ‘inner core’ of the metros, major secondary cities, some mining 
towns, tourism belts and selected parts of the bantustans accounted for almost 80% of GVA 
and 54% of the population in 1996. An ‘outer core’ of large towns with service functions, 
medium-sized mining towns, dormitory settlements linked to the inner core areas and large 
population clusters around the homeland capitals accounted for 12% of GVA and 22% of the 
population. ‘Peripheral’ areas with even less economic activity included smaller towns, 
other bantustan settlements and dispersed rural communities.  
A mismatch between where people lived and worked was also very apparent within the 
cities and towns. Apartheid policies and modernist planning had created sprawling, 
fragmented settlements, with average population densities rising with distance from the 
centre and highest in black townships and squatter settlements on the edge (SACN, 2011). 
Despite state initiatives to promote township shopping centres in the 1980s, their 
economies remained very thin, forcing workers to commute long distances at high cost 
(NPC, 2012). The flight of offices and retail from the CBDs to historically white suburban 
centres during the 1990s exacerbated these divisions. Township infrastructure and services 
were poor because of under-investment during apartheid and the history of race-based 
local government. Urban restructuring and township transformation soon became 
important expressed objectives for the post-1994 government (NPC, 2012; Harrison and 
Todes, 2015). It was recognised that overcoming spatial fragmentation would improve 
access to jobs and amenities, and increase the functional efficiency of cities. 
3.4. Economic Dynamics and Settlement Patterns since 1994 
Political stability helped to restore modest economic growth after 1994, but little was done 
about many of the country’s structural problems (NPC, 2012; Bhorat et al., 2014). Social 
reconciliation and nation-building were immediate priorities of the government of national 
unity. Another was to stabilise the macro-economic situation and attract foreign direct 
investment by removing industrial subsidies, import protections and controls on financial 
and product markets associated with the apartheid government. In practice, the average 
growth rate rose to almost 3% per annum between 1994 and 2004, reaching 5% in the 
subsequent boom years before the global downturn in 2008. Since then, South Africa’s 
economic performance has been lacklustre, attributable partly to depressed global 
commodity prices, political and regulatory uncertainty, conflictual labour relations, low 
rates of fixed investment and infrastructure bottlenecks (Bhorat et al., 2014; Black, 2016). 
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The deputy Finance Minister argued recently that the 1994 national consensus has reached 
its limit and was now unravelling. It had paved the way for democracy and introduced vital 
social reforms, but did little to alter the structural features of the economy that produce a 
vicious cycle of slow growth and high inequality (Jonas, 2017). 
The composition of growth has been skewed towards the tertiary sector, particularly 
consumer-driven and financial services. Manufacturing investment has been modest and 
focused on capital-intensive sectors, resulting in weak job creation (Black, 2016). Bhorat et 
al. (2014) argue that an implicit social contract between government, business and 
organised labour has underpinned a “growth path favouring capital-intensity over labour-
intensity … heavy manufacturing over light” (p.33). SA has not moved up global value chains 
towards products and services based on innovation and design. Exports continue to be 
dominated by minerals, such as coal and platinum. Employment growth since 1994 has been 
pedestrian and insufficient to absorb new entrants to the labour market, resulting in rising 
unemployment to between 26-38% depending on the definition (Turok, 2014). Rising state 
spending on basic services, healthcare, education and social grants (amounting to two-thirds 
of the national budget) has lifted more than 3.5 million people out of poverty and hardship 
(National Treasury, 2017). However, inequality has continued to creep up because highly 
skilled and wealthy households have become better-off (Philip et al., 2014).    
Several authors argue that the orthodox, market-friendly economic policies arising from the 
compromises of the transition are partly responsible (Bundy, 2014; Habib, 2013; Hart, 
2013). For example, the decision to liberalise economic controls enabled major 
conglomerates to shift their primary share listings, headquarters and other interests abroad 
(Jonas, 2017). The sudden withdrawal of tariff protections and state subsidies exposed 
manufacturing and agriculture to the shock of global competition, causing extensive 
closures and redundancies (Philip et al., 2014). Political pressure to alter the demographic 
(racial) profile of business leadership led to cosmetic changes to the boards of companies 
and the creation of a new black elite, but no real challenge to concentrated ownership and 
little new wealth creation (Bhorat et al., 2014). The dominant position of major firms in 
supplying goods and services to low-income consumers has also constrained the 
opportunities for small business growth (Philip et al., 2014). Post-apartheid land reform 
programmes, agricultural policies and rural development initiatives seem to have brought 
little improvement to incomes and living standards in the countryside (Cousins, 2014; Philip 
et al., 2014).  
Meanwhile, the growth of financial services, a debt-funded consumer spending boom and 
the burgeoning real estate industry have reinforced spatial concentration in Gauteng, and to 
a lesser extent the other cities. There had been some dispersal of labour-intensive industries 
such as clothing and textiles during the 1980s in search of incentives and lower wages (see 
Chapter 4). However, these sources of employment contracted sharply after the mid-1990s. 
The metros increased their share of national employment from 52% to 58% between 1996 
and 2012 (Turok and Borel-Saladin, 2013). The secondary cities performed poorly with their 
more specialised economies focused on mining, distribution or selected manufacturing 
industries. Put simply, the sectoral make-up and spatial distribution of the economy have 
narrowed over the last two decades. Migration patterns have naturally followed economic 
activity, leading to greater concentration in the cities. The rate of population growth in each 
city has tended to correspond with the rate of employment growth, producing a better 
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alignment than before (Turok and Borel-Saladin, 2014). This is beneficial in terms of access 
to opportunities and balanced development. It is misleading to refer to ‘excessive’ 
urbanisation, i.e. workforce growth outstripping jobs to a greater extent than elsewhere. 
Yet there remains a serious employment shortfall in the cities, just as there is elsewhere.  
The urbanisation rebound was not surprising following the removal of apartheid controls, 
although it is difficult to separate this from the economic shifts noted above. The level of 
urbanisation rose from 53% in 1994 to 63% in 2011 (Turok and Borel-Saladin, 2014). The 
metros’ population grew at an average of 2.4% per annum, compared to national rate of 
1.5%. The growth of Johannesburg (3.2%) and Tshwane (3.9%) was particularly rapid (Todes, 
2014). Gauteng also attracted migration flows from other African countries, some of which 
were in turmoil. The supply of formal housing in the big cities failed to keep pace with 
population growth, resulting in burgeoning shack dwellings. Deficient housing, basic services 
and jobs are sources of growing discontent and social unrest in the major urban townships 
and informal settlements. 
Changes in the mining industry mean that traditional male migrant labour has been replaced 
by more complex movements of men and women to cities. Many are engaged in precarious 
livelihoods in the informal economy, domestic work, construction and security (Cox et al., 
2004). There is some debate about the extent to which urban-rural links have been 
maintained by these households (Posel and Marx, 2011). There has been movement out of 
the bantustans, although they continue to operate as areas of social reproduction with 
disproportionate numbers of children and older people. They remain heavily dependent on 
financial transfers from the cities (through social grants and fiscal redistribution), with the 
highest poverty rates in the country (Noble and Wright, 2013). The damaging character of 
contemporary migration patterns was demonstrated all too vividly by the Marikana disaster 
in 2012, where police confrontation with striking mineworkers led to many deaths. The 
protestors’ grievances arose partly from the fact they were living in squalid shack 
settlements in order to remit part of their earnings to their families back in the rural areas 
(Alexander et al., 2012).    
Within the towns and cities there has been some racial desegregation as black people have 
moved into inner cities and suburbs previously reserved for other groups. However, the 
population of the townships and informal settlements has increased much more strongly, 
and major new state-sponsored housing schemes have been built on the outskirts. Basic 
public services in the townships have generally improved since they are now run by large 
metro authorities, which stress the need for redress and redistribution in service delivery. 
Established townships such as Soweto now include middle-income groups alongside very 
poor communities. There has also been a modest increase in township economic activity 
(particularly shopping centres, spaza shops3 and informal trade), although it remains 
consumption-oriented and is dwarfed by the growth of new office complexes, business 
parks and shopping malls in middle and upper-income suburbs, often far away and 
inaccessible by public transport (Harrison and Todes, 2015). These blatant disparities in 
wealth and income also help to explain the increasing disaffection and unrest among 
township residents.   
3.5. Post-Apartheid Governance and Spatial Policies     
                                                          
3
 Small, generally informal, shops offering convenience goods.  
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Orthodox macro-economic policies post-apartheid have been accompanied by strongly 
redistributive social policies, including social grants, basic services, free housing, health and 
education (Habib, 2013; Bundy, 2014). Spatial equity in terms of human development has 
been an important undercurrent, based on a commitment to universal entitlement and 
citizenship. The 1996 Constitution gave all households the right to essential services, 
irrespective of location, depending on the resources available to the state and the feasibility 
of provision. Hence the nature of each service could vary depending on whether the 
population was concentrated or dispersed in scattered settlements. In any case the result 
has been relatively rapid roll-out of electricity, water, sanitation and other municipal 
services (i.e. people-centred programmes) in hitherto neglected areas with large backlogs 
(Turok and Borel-Saladin, 2014). The budget  
“redistributes substantial resources from the urban economy to fund services in 
rural areas … Metropolitan municipalities account for 70% of personal income tax 
revenue, but receive only 31% of local government transfers. Similarly, the 61 mostly 
rural local municipalities also receive 31% of transfers to local government, but 
account for 5% of personal income tax revenues” (National Treasury, 2017, p.71). 
A new system of provinces was created that incorporated the bantustans and deliberately 
erased their boundaries (Figure 1). The main responsibilities of the provinces are healthcare 
and education. They receive 43% of the national budget, which is allocated according to a 
formula. This also favours rural areas because of their higher poverty and demand for public 
healthcare and schooling. Thus government funding per capita to the mainly rural provinces 
of Eastern Cape and Limpopo is more than a quarter higher than it is for Gauteng (National 
Treasury, 2017, figure 5.1). There is clearly a difficult balance to be struck between spending 
to alleviate poverty and investment to prepare for a more inclusive and sustainable urban 
future. 
An uneven patchwork of small municipalities was consolidated in 2000 to create large 
authorities, supposedly with enhanced administrative capabilities and the scope to 
redistribute resources from affluent to deprived communities. Municipal powers were 
expanded to include social and economic development, and local tax revenues were 
supplemented by national grants. The budget allocates more than double the funding per 
capita to rural municipalities than it does to the metros (National Treasury, 2017, figure 5.2). 
Some of the principles of what elsewhere are now called place-based policies were 
introduced through Integrated Development Plans required of every municipality. They 
were intended to provide a vision of the area backed by a 5-year strategy that was to be 
supported by other parts of government. Many municipalities also introduced area-based 
initiatives and local economic development schemes to upgrade their poorest districts.4  
Although most public services have improved throughout the country since 1994, 
differences persist within and between municipalities. These reflect disparities in economic 
conditions, institutional capacity and professional skills. Skewing more public funds towards 
the poorest municipalities has not translated into more equitable outcomes, partly because 
they have been unable to spend the resources effectively. Integrated development across 
government has been a prominent objective, but implementation has consistently fallen 
                                                          
4
 This paper does not discuss local economic development since it is not spatially targeted in the sense defined 
earlier. For a review, see Nel and Rogerson (2016).  
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short (Harrison et al., 2008; Presidency, 2014; Bhorat et al., 2014). Coordination has been 
poor at all levels, partly because of inexperience and because the ruling party is a broach 
church encompassing diverse ideas and groupings. It has lacked a coherent development 
philosophy or strategy for the country, resulting in disparate policies and priorities between 
departmental silos and spheres of government (NPC, 2012; Jonas, 2017).  
The first attempt to create an overarching national Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP) in the mid-1990s failed because of these tensions and the power of 
orthodoxy. The ruling party has since succumbed to patronage politics, rent-seeking and 
factionalism variously centred on particular personalities or resource streams (Habib, 2013; 
Bundy, 2014; Jonas, 2017). Some internal differences were to be expected because the post-
apartheid government has a far wider political constituency than the apartheid state. It has 
had to balance powerful demands for redress and recompense for historic injustices against 
the need to retain scarce professional skill-sets and business experience. It has also had to 
incorporate unsympathetic and ill-equipped officials into the public service, including former 
bantustan officials. Pressures for cadre deployment and political appointments have further 
hampered the building of an effective state administration capable of implementing a 
sophisticated development agenda (Chipkin and Meny-Gibert, 2011; NPC, 2012; Turok, 
2014).  
The ambitions of developmental local government have been particularly difficult to realise. 
Hart (2013) argues that municipalities face impossible structural conditions, with high levels 
of poverty and constrained resources. Ineffectual leadership, undue political interference, 
financial mismanagement and a growing culture of patronage and nepotism are additional 
problems (COGTA 2009a; SACN 2011; FFC 2011; Pieterse and Van Donk 2013). Spatial 
connectivity and integration would be difficult enough for highly capacitated city 
governments to engineer. For rural municipalities with weak tax bases and deficient 
technical skills it is probably a pipedream (FFC, 2011). Several metros have developed a 
stronger appetite for urban integration and spatial restructuring through experimentation 
and innovation, sometimes backed by particular national departments, such as the Treasury 
(Turok, 2016).  
 
Recognition of institutional weaknesses has had a big influence on national spatial policies 
and support for spatial targeting. Post-apartheid spatial thinking has shifted away from 
apartheid spatial rebalancing towards a combination of space-neutral and place-based 
policies. Periodic attempts have been made to introduce explicit national spatial policies, 
partly as a means to strengthen government coordination and to guide the country’s future 
territorial development. Disagreement over whether to support an essentially space-neutral 
approach or some form of spatial targeting has been a major stumbling block. The result has 
been a series of programmes influenced by different ideas about spatial targeting, including 
traditional attempts to steer investment in a particular direction. 
 
The 2003 National Spatial Development Perspective (NSDP) was the first explicit national 
spatial policy.5 It originated a few years earlier when several departments called for action 
                                                          
5
 An earlier initiative to develop a National Spatial Framework to improve spatial synergies in government by 
consolidating provincial spatial plans failed since these plans were weakly developed and there was resistance 
by government departments to centrally directed spatial development (Harrison et al., 2008; Oranje, 2010).  
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to address the “lack of coordination in state expenditure and investment in the different 
sectors and spheres of government” (Oranje and Merrifield, 2010, p.34). Disjointed 
investments in roads, seaports and other economic infrastructure reflected different 
agendas and were dissipating public resources. Another concern was that some forms of 
government spending seemed to perpetuate apartheid spatial patterns.  
 
The country’s economic difficulties meant that stronger growth was the paramount concern 
of the NSDP (Platzky, 1998; Oranje, 2010). The resources available for capital investment 
were scarce and expenditure decisions had to be judicious. The NSDP authors were 
influenced by space-neutral type arguments put forward by the business-sponsored Urban 
Foundation (UF) (1990) in its earlier critique of apartheid regional policy. The UF maintained 
that attempts to disperse industry flew in the face of economic forces, undermined the 
performance of cities and meant unsustainable growth on the periphery. Anticipating the 
World Bank (2009) report, it said that government should embrace the growth of big cities 
and stop diverting resources towards marginal areas.   
 
The NSDP authors were also keen to avoid reinforcing inherited geographic distortions, 
including large populations in settlements with no economic base. Tough choices were 
needed to start transforming these patterns. Echoing space-neutral ideas, the NSDP 
suggested that “efforts to address past and current inequalities should focus on people not 
place” (Presidency, 2006, iii). It was fair and reasonable for social programmes to invest in 
areas of need, but costly economic infrastructure should focus on areas with genuine 
development potential, in the expectation that people would migrate there: 
“government spending on fixed investment should be focused on localities of 
economic growth and/or economic potential in order to gear up private-sector 
investment, to stimulate sustainable economic activities and to create long-term 
employment opportunities” (Ibid.) 
 
The background research stressed the importance of agglomeration economies and noted 
Gauteng’s long-standing dominance. The policy subtext was to support growth in Gauteng 
and other metropolitan areas, although the authors avoided framing it this way because of 
political sensitivities and opposition from rural supporters. Nevertheless, the NSDP still had 
a difficult passage in government. Key consultants on the policy subsequently stated that:  
 
“resistance to the NSDP arose because it challenged the basic assumption of the 
ANC and government at the time that poverty alleviation should be focused 
mainly in rural areas, where it was believed that ‘the poorest of the poor’ were 
located, while economic growth would be supported mainly in urban areas” 
(Oranje and Merrifield, 2010, p.37).  
 
There was also a widespread belief in the ANC that rural-urban migration was socially 
damaging, and that cities could look after themselves financially. In fact it took at least a 
decade for the basic ideas of the NSDP to gain any traction in government. Meanwhile, 
other policies went in contradictory directions (Harrison et al., 2008).  
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A 2006 revision of the NSDP toned down the space-neutral thinking by arguing that the 26 
most important economic centres and their hinterlands should be targeted for support. 
These accommodated a much bigger share of SA’s population than the major cities alone. 
Yet the NSDP still had little impact. The whole endeavour was criticised for supporting 
relatively well-off groups and attributed to the “neo-liberal … class project” of President 
Thabo Mbeki, who was recalled by the ANC in 2008 (Oranje and Merrifield, 2010, p.38). A 
separate initiative to introduce a national urban policy shortly afterwards was also side-
lined (Turok and Parnell, 2009), as the priority shifted towards rural development, 
reinforced by the election of populist President Jacob Zuma, whose power base and 
predispositions were in the countryside.    
 
Debates about whether to support growth wherever it emerges or to steer it elsewhere 
have been ongoing post-apartheid, particularly as spatial inequalities were so strongly 
associated with apartheid. The tendency to conflate poverty with rural areas, and economic 
orthodoxy with spatial concentration, has made the conundrum particularly difficult. It is all 
too apparent in the New Growth Path (NGP), an economic policy framework introduced by 
President Zuma in 2009. It states that the government will skew resources towards rural 
areas to address housing and service backlogs, but ignores the much faster growing 
backlogs in the cities as a result of urbanisation. It mentions the word ‘rural’ 35 times, 
‘urban’ four times, ‘metros’ three times and ‘cities’ once (Turok, 2014). Several proposals to 
support predominantly rural ‘distressed areas’ have emerged from the NGP, including plans 
for major infrastructure corridors, industrial zones and tourism facilities (Rogerson and Nel, 
2016).   
In the absence of an explicit national spatial framework, a variety of divergent initiatives 
have co-existed. The spatial programmes and projects discussed in the following two 
chapters emerged through piecemeal efforts by many different actors and agencies within 
or close to government. They were responding to different territorial concerns and drew 
selectively on international experience. Ideas that resonate with place-based development 
have proved to be quite influential, although earlier generations of international and 
domestic spatial policies have also had a bearing on the approaches adopted.   
 
An important strand of policy effort has been a series of area-based initiatives aimed at 
developing former townships and other deprived localities, discussed in Chapter 5. Two 
themes running through these projects have been redress for historic neglect through more 
coordinated and responsive governance, and investment in public infrastructure to improve 
living conditions and livelihoods. The long track record of regional initiatives is discussed in 
Chapter 4. Economic development has been their overriding objective, pursued through 
various special measures and governance arrangements. Economic considerations have 
featured more strongly than in the localised initiatives, although implementation of this has 
been uneven. 
 
Recognition that coordination and long-term planning were systemic weaknesses in 
government led to the establishment of a National Planning Commission (NPC) in 2010. The 
process encouraged reflection on the country’s spatial problems, and created an 
environment in which new ideas could emerge. The resulting National Development Plan 
(NDP) included a chapter entitled ‘transforming human settlements and the national space 
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economy’ which went beyond simple spatial rebalancing or space-neutral approaches (NPC, 
2012). It argued that spatial policies needed to address a range of issues and take different 
forms accordingly. Uneven economic development was a reality, yet there were 
opportunities in less-favoured regions that could still be unlocked. Consistent with place-
based thinking, it advocated a differentiated policy with multiple spatial targets, including:  
(i) major cities and development corridors with strong growth potential, but whose 
competitiveness needed to be enhanced;   
(ii) rural restructuring zones where the population was consolidating in new 
settlements and there was agricultural, tourism or mining potential;  
(iii) resource critical regions providing vital ecosystem services (such as water and 
biodiversity) and/or mineral deposits, and requiring careful management of 
competing land-uses, and  
(iv) special intervention areas facing unique problems of decline or potential for 
rapid growth (NPC, 2012).  
 
An underlying theme was that urban and rural areas are interdependent and should not be 
treated in isolation. The NDP also advocated the formulation of a national spatial framework 
and stressed the need for compact, coherent and connected urban development. This 
prompted a new stream of policy work which culminated in an Integrated Urban 
Development Framework approved by the Cabinet in 2016 (COGTA, 2016; Pieterse and 
Cirolia, 2016). The NDP raised concerns about the poor territorial alignment of different 
government policies and programmes, which triggered an internal review of spatial policies 
led by the National Treasury. This found many examples of fragmented and inconsistent 
spatial initiatives, which dilutes their impact and is confusing for investors and other 
stakeholders. The review reiterated the plea for an overarching national framework for 
spatial development, coupled with better coordination of key funding programmes for 
housing, transport and other infrastructure. It also advocated stronger regional and local 
partnerships to draw relevant actors and interests into a shared agenda for developing 
particular places. This remains work in progress, without an obvious political champion at 
national level. 
 
3.6. Conclusion 
The post-apartheid government inherited entrenched social and spatial inequalities and 
fractured state institutions. The negotiated political transition and grim economic situation 
further complicated the possibility of reorienting the spatial economy. Growth has been 
tepid and concentrated in Gauteng and the other cities, although not through any deliberate 
intention or planning. Some mining regions and secondary cities have also experienced 
growth. The former bantustans show little sign of recovery and remain dependent on 
transfers. Basic public services in rural areas have improved, although people continue to 
migrate towards the cities and ‘adjust’ to the reality of unequal growth. This is consistent 
with a space-neutral perspective and has brought some benefits. Households seem better-
off in cities than elsewhere, on average, and there is closer alignment between the 
geography of jobs and population across the country than there was two decades ago.  
Yet the migration process is unsatisfactory in other respects, being socially-selective and 
yielding patterns of temporary movement and precarious livelihoods stretched over long 
distances. There is a serious shortage of jobs throughout the country, so unemployment and 
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poverty are very high everywhere. There are no islands of generalised prosperity or well-
being, except within wealthy suburbs and gated communities. Compared with many other 
middle-income countries, it appears that opportunities for faster and more inclusive 
economic development have been missed, both in the cities and elsewhere, through 
infrastructure shortfalls, deficient workforce skills, inappropriate regulations and 
incapacitated state institutions (NPC, 2012; Bhorat et al., 2014; Black, 2016). Large parts of 
the country are rich in natural resources, mineral deposits, tourism attractions and 
renewable energy potential, such that a more pro-active spatial policy could have achieved 
more than the reactive stance of space-neutrality. 
Spatial policy has shifted from treating land and space as instruments of social engineering, 
to the current more diffuse, ambivalent position that recognises past injustices but is 
uncertain what to do about them. Many initiatives have been taken, albeit in a piecemeal 
and often half-hearted manner without any overarching national strategy. Some conform to 
a traditional spatial rebalancing approach, while others chime with place-based ideas. 
Efforts to formulate a more cogent urban policy to unlock the economic potential of cities 
and to promote physical restructuring have struggled to gain traction as a result of capacity 
constraints and because they are perceived to neglect rural poverty.  
The NDP introduced new perspectives with the potential to transcend traditional dualisms – 
between areas of need and potential, rural and urban, regional and local – by advocating a 
more nuanced approach. This holds out the prospect of addressing the distinctive issues in 
different places with differentiated policies. It remains to be seen whether this is sufficiently 
clear and compelling to garner support within the state, in the face of many competing 
agendas. There is a risk of excessive priorities and permutations in seeking to be all-
encompassing. Concrete policies and programmes are still some way off, which is one of the 
reasons why it is vital to learn from past experience.  
Chapter 4: The Experience of Regional Development Policies  
4.1  Introduction  
Chapter 3 identified some of the major challenges facing spatial policies in SA, and how the 
objectives have been transformed over time. Chapters 4 and 5 analyse the experience of 
spatial targeting in more detail, using the three categories identified in Chapter 2. In broad 
terms, policy has shifted from spatial rebalancing under apartheid towards different forms 
of place-based development. The space-neutral perspective has also been influential, but 
more as a persistent critique of spatial targeting than a concrete alternative. In practice 
many of the actual programmes have been hybrids, influenced by international thinking 
along with domestic realities. The main dimensions according to which spatial policies vary 
are their objectives, target areas, instruments, resources, timescales and institutional 
arrangements. 
This chapter discusses three types of policy that have sought to address the regional 
distribution of economic development. The chapter outlines the objectives of each policy, 
then its content and what is known about its impact and effectiveness. There have been few 
systematic evaluations undertaken of these policies. This is symptomatic of the general 
weakness of evidence-based policy in SA, at least until recently. The paucity of robust 
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evidence limits the precision of the present analysis and the possibility of definitive 
comparisons based on cost-effectiveness or other criteria.   
The chapter begins by examining SA’s most sustained form of spatial policy, industrial 
decentralisation. It was introduced in 1960 and enjoyed unusual longevity until 1996. The 
chapter then considers the post-apartheid Spatial Development Initiatives between 1996 
and 2001, followed by the Industrial Development Zones. One of the messages to emerge is 
that regional development cannot be achieved by following a formula, such as offering 
financial incentives. It depends on the dynamic interactions between a mixture of factors in 
a particular place and time, any of which can jeopardise success. Governments have been 
inclined to tinker with different levels of incentive and eligibility criteria, when shifting the 
economic trajectory of a place usually requires much more than this. 
 
4.2  Industrial Decentralisation   
The Regional Industrial Decentralisation Programme (RIDP) was introduced in 1960 to steer 
jobs away from the major cities in order to restrict the black African urban population. It 
coincided with the apartheid state developing its policies for homeland resettlement and 
influx controls. This was a period of buoyant economic growth, seemingly offering many 
opportunities to disperse expanding factories. It was also a period when political resistance 
to apartheid policies was repressed, so implementation could proceed.  
The initial focus was on areas bordering the bantustans (‘border areas’), particularly those 
located close to the cities and appearing to have the best growth prospects. It was 
rationalized in terms of ‘alleviating over-congestion’ in cities and creating jobs near the 
homelands (Dewar et al., 1984, p.4). The RIDP was broadened in 1965 to include areas of 
high unemployment for whites, coloureds and Indians. It was strengthened in 1967 with 
restrictions imposed on business expansion in the cities in an effort to limit the continuing 
growth of the black African urban population. The RIDP became a more deliberate tool to 
bolster homeland development from 1968, with the idea of providing an economic base in 
these areas. Meanwhile firms in the cities became frustrated with restrictions on their 
expansion and threatened an investment strike. In 1971 a commission of inquiry was set up 
which relaxed the controls and enhanced the incentives for relocation, to avoid harming 
economic performance (Dewar et al., 1984). Industrial dispersal as spatial rebalancing had 
clearly come into conflict with efficiency and growth objectives. The tension between 
ideology and economic realities continued later on, forcing the state to compromise by 
pursuing a more facilitative approach emphasising carrots rather than sticks.   
The RIDP was subsequently extended to incorporate new planning concepts drawn from 
international experience. An influential idea was to create large growth poles by locating 
heavy industry outside the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging (PWV) region (now 
Gauteng). This included new seaports which would improve the efficiency of importing raw 
materials and exporting finished products. The IDC and state-owned enterprises, such as the 
iron and steel company (Iscor) played vital roles in implementation through very substantial 
direct investment. This illustrated the value of a capable state, able to coordinate  sectoral 
and spatial policies, and fuelled by buoyant tax revenues during a period of relative 
economic strength. 
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The 1975 National Physical Development Plan (NPDP) went further with highly ambitious 
proposals for development axes, growth areas and deconcentration points to counteract 
‘over-concentration’ in the big cities and to accommodate white out-migration from rural 
areas (Dewar et al., 1984). Many of the designated areas had already received some support 
under earlier policies, but the level of incentives was enhanced. Several new places were 
also established to encourage industrial dispersal, such as Atlantis, a new settlement aimed 
at relocating coloured people from Cape Town. It attracted some 50 factories and 12,788 
jobs by the late 1980s (Ryan, 2015). Most firms were branch plants or relocations from Cape 
Town, and were dependent on skilled labour and managers commuting from the city. They 
contracted sharply when the incentives were withdrawn in the 1990s (Nel and Meston, 
1996).  
The RIDP was expanded again in 1982 as part of wider reforms to apartheid and in response 
to the shifting political conditions. The priority was reaffirmed to support homeland 
development through job creation. An ‘urban insider/rural outsider’ strategy became more 
apparent to divide the black African population into those with rights to the city and those 
confined to the homelands. The policy was construed as regional development spanning the 
homelands and adjacent ‘white’ areas. This was more flexible than the restrictive homeland 
boundaries applied previously. The homelands were now portrayed as being within South 
Africa (Oranje and Merrifield, 2010).  
As resistance to apartheid mounted, the economy stagnated. Government reforms faltered 
and state policy became less ideological and more market-friendly. Business critiques of the 
RIDP were acknowledged, leading to a major review by the Development Bank of Southern 
Africa (DBSA) in 1989 (Platzky, 1995). The tension between space-neutral ideas and spatial 
targeting went to the heart of the matter. The DBSA’s report recommended replacing 
industrial decentralisation with a policy focused on developing the comparative advantage 
of regions. Their argument was that the state should not try to steer investment to places 
without proven economic potential. The government rejected this idea, but modified the 
RIDP in significant ways. It accepted the DBSA’s alternative suggestion to modify the policy 
on the basis that firms tended to overestimate the advantages of the PWV, hence there was 
market failure (DBSA, 1989). There was also an argument that macro-economic policies had 
strengthened the PWV at the expense of the coastal metropoles.6 The government 
extended the areas eligible for incentives to everywhere outside the core metropoles, so 
spatial targeting was diluted. These revisions were made in 1991 and the RIDP continued 
until it was dismantled by the post-apartheid government in 1996.  
4.2.1  Policy Content 
The main instruments of the RIDP were investment incentives and the creation of industrial 
parks and associated infrastructure. The composition of these subsidies changed and the 
value increased over time (Dewar et al., 1984). The 1982 RIDP included sizeable 
employment incentives which benefited labour-intensive industries, especially in the 
remote bantustans. Much smaller incentives were available in deconcentration points 
within 100km of the cities. The incentives were lowered in 1991 and reoriented towards 
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 This debate remains relevant today, as macro-economic policies have arguably contributed to economic 
concentration in Gauteng, linked to the growth of financial services, and the decline of labour-intensive 
manufacturing.  
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raising competitiveness by encouraging capital intensity and technology upgrading. A 
package for small firms was also introduced following criticisms of their neglect. A new form 
of spatially differentiated incentive was put in place, with the most generous subsidies 
available outside the PWV, Cape Town and Durban. On the periphery of Cape Town and 
Durban, 60% of the incentive was available. 
Between the 1960s and the late 1980s, labour legislation also varied between metropolitan, 
border and homeland areas. Job reservation7 did not apply in border areas and homelands; 
wages in border areas were lower; and minimum wages in the homelands were abolished in 
1970. Trade unions were also outlawed in several of the homelands.8 This demonstrates an 
unusually concerted approach to spatial targeting that included labour market deregulation. 
It explains why regional policy in SA is sometimes described as offering some of the most 
generous location incentives of any country in the world (Rogerson and Nel, 2016). 
Incentives on the periphery were also complemented by growth restrictions in the cities. 
This was achieved by controlling the expansion of industrial land and limiting the growth of 
labour-intensive factories. These tough controls were softened in 1971 following business 
opposition, but ‘non-locality bound’ (i.e. mobile) industries with a high proportion of black 
workers were forced to move elsewhere. These constraints were withdrawn in 1982 when 
the emphasis shifted to positive incentives (Dewar et al., 1984).   
Eligible areas varied over time, and each policy revision seemed to introduce a new set of 
assisted areas. The designation of many different locations undermined a basic principle of 
targeting, i.e. selectivity. This tendency was exacerbated by the ability of local politicians to 
influence the designation of towns. The cities of the PWV, Cape Town, Durban and Port 
Elizabeth were generally excluded. Specially-created decentralisation points included 
Richards Bay and Isithebe in KwaZulu-Natal (KZN), Rosslyn near Tshwane, and Atlantis near 
Cape Town. The emphasis on deconcentration in the 1975 NPDP and the 1982 RIDP 
reflected both the desire to reduce urban congestion and the difficulty of persuading firms 
to move further into the bantustans (Dewar et al., 1984).  
Richards Bay and Saldanha were created as new ports and growth poles following the 1975 
NPDP. Sizeable resources went into developing their infrastructure. In other places, such as 
Newcastle and Ladysmith (both in KZN), small towns were designated as decentralisation 
points, while industrial estates offering bigger incentives were created in adjacent 
homelands. Large industrial estates with advance factories were set up in homeland towns, 
such as Butterworth in the Transkei. They were also created in or close to resettlement 
areas, such as Dimbaza in the Eastern Cape and Botshabelo in the Free State. Vigorous 
efforts were clearly being made to reshape the economic geography of these regions in line 
with changing settlement patterns.  
4.2.2  Policy Impact  
In practice, the RDIP did not prove to be very effective at creating jobs in peripheral 
locations during its first two decades. McCarthy (1983) found that a maximum of 150,000 
                                                          
7
 Reserving certain categories of work for whites. 
8
 There has been much debate about the importance of labour regulations, and whether they should be 
relaxed in Special Economic Zones. Some critics argue that the failure of Industrial Development Zones in SA in 
the last decade is partly attributable to the lack of labour market deregulation (CDE, 2012).  
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jobs were generated between 1960 and 1980, compared to 115,000 new job seekers 
entering the homeland labour market each year. Bell’s (1973) seminal study of 
decentralisation in the 1960s showed that government statistics were exaggerated. The 
policy created 11,600 jobs at most, compared to the official figure of 87,000. Critics argued 
that there was little indirect job creation through multiplier effects, and that many jobs 
were lost through metropolitan restrictions. For example, rejected applications for the 
expansion of factories in the cities affected 320,000 workers between 1968 and 1978 
(Rogerson, 1982). Many factories which relocated from PWV moved to Cape Town or 
Durban, not to marginal locations. When they did move to designated deconcentration 
points, it was usually to those closest to the cities, such as Hammarsdale near Durban 
(McCarthy, 1983). 
The enhanced incentives of the 1980s had far bigger impacts. Despite the slowdown, about 
147,000 jobs were estimated to have been created in decentralisation points between 1982 
and 1987 alone (DBSA, 1989; Platzky, 1995). Employment growth in these areas was greater 
than in the cities, some of which experienced net job losses in manufacturing (Harrison, 
1995). Many labour-intensive jobs moved out, particularly clothing factories. Tomlinson and 
Addleson (1987) argued that decentralisation was driven by the elevated incentives. Bell 
(1983, 1986) showed that competitive pressures in the clothing industry had a bigger effect 
on factory relocation. Labour-intensive segments moved to access cheap labour. During the 
1980s firms were facing intensified competition from Asia, exacerbated by illegal imports. 
Many transferred their routine, low-skilled activities to decentralisation points where they 
could pay lower wages and where unions were weak or banned. State incentives may have 
contributed to these decisions, but in conjunction with market pressures. Some foreign 
clothing firms also started up in these locations. Taiwanese companies were well-
represented because wages were rising at home, making labour-intensive production less 
viable (Hart, 2002; Pickles and Wood, 1989). The key point is that internal dynamics within 
particular industries played a vital role in enabling the RIDP to take effect.   
The revised RIDP in 1991 skewed the incentives towards capital investment. Nevertheless, 
import penetration continued to pressurise clothing firms to shift to lower-wage locations. 
There were also signs that the clothing industry was growing in the periphery even without 
incentives (Hart and Todes, 1997). A study of the 1991 RIDP’s impact in KZN showed that 
only 39% of projects and 37.5% of jobs were located in Durban (Harrison and Todes, 1996). 
The place that benefited most was Isithebe, which was also the most successful 
decentralisation point in the 1980s. The study also found that the incentives did not play a 
major role in these factories’ location decisions and were not critical to their survival. This 
finding was supported by other studies of the RIDP elsewhere (BDM, 1996; Sharp and 
Speigel, 1996; Luiz and van der Waal, 1997). The National Productivity Institute’s (1996) 
financial studies questioned these assessments and argued that most firms would not have 
survived without the incentives.   
All things considered, it seems that the RIDP policy had a sizeable short-term impact, 
especially during the 1980s. Its impact varied greatly between locations, indicating that 
other factors were also involved. KZN was a major beneficiary of the 1982 RIDP and 
accounted for 28% of the new jobs. Small peripheral places, such as Ulundi, attracted few 
firms. Places that benefited most were reasonably close to the cities (such as Isithebe and 
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Rosslyn) or on major transport routes (such as Newcastle and Ladysmith). Labour-related 
issues also appear to have influenced which locations attracted investment.  
While the RIDP has been presented as classic top-down and run by central government, the 
role of local institutions in recruiting firms and shaping local development was also 
important (Platzky, 1995; Hart and Todes, 1997). Homeland development corporations were 
responsible for managing the policy in their areas and developing industrial sites and 
buildings9. Platzky’s (1995) study of Isithebe shows the importance of the KZN-Finance 
Corporation (KFC) in actively seeking out firms to attract. It worked to ensure some 
economic diversity to avoid dominance by low-waged clothing factories and to deepen local 
linkages. This did not happen in Botshabelo or Selosesha, which were run by different 
agencies. Hart (2002) shows the role played by the Newcastle municipality in recruiting 
Asian firms, and how the creation of a Taiwanese community laid the basis for further 
growth and development. Local institutions could also perform poorly and undermine 
development. Studies of Butterworth show that while the rapid withdrawal of incentives in 
the 1990s was a catalyst for widespread industrial closures, the problems were exacerbated 
by ongoing political conflict and poor management in local government (Hosking and 
Haines, 1997; Hofmeyer and Maasdorp, 1993). This led to the collapse of infrastructure, 
crime, rising wage demands and labour disputes.   
Industrial location policies are commonly criticised for promoting narrow local economies 
with weak linkages and poor quality jobs (Dewar et al., 1984; Tomlinson and Addleson, 
1987). Platzky (1995) showed substantial differences between the three destinations she 
examined. Isithebe diversified beyond clothing and showed signs of local embedding, but 
this was not the case elsewhere. Unions were also well-established in Isithebe and wages 
were rising, suggesting that a pattern of cumulative advantage was beginning to emerge. 
Nevertheless, many of the larger unionised firms closed or relocated after the incentives 
were withdrawn and trade liberalisation occurred after 1994. The initial job losses were not 
as severe as in the other decentralisation points, but many of remaining jobs were in poorly-
paid Taiwanese garment factories. Several  of these firms  moved out of SA by 2009, linked 
to the recession and rising statutory minimum wages (Hunter, 2010).  
Growth poles were supposed to generate more integrated local economies. Richards Bay 
managed to attract a few large, capital-intensive factories (e.g. two aluminium smelters, a 
truck factory and a fertilizer plant), but with weak local linkages. Output increased for many 
years, but relatively few jobs were created. Each wave of new investment resulted in land 
and other price spikes in the local economy, which might have deterred other factories from 
locating there (Todes and Vaughan, 1999). The smelters’ heavy demand for cheap electricity 
has proved to be unsustainable in the context of national energy crises, and has also 
hindered further inward investment. This illustrates another way in which these policies can 
impede broad-based development. 
A fundamental question is whether the RIDP’s impact was sustained or a short-lived? Critics 
argued that it induced artificial development and that whatever investment took place 
would collapse when the incentives were removed (Tomlinson and Addleson, 1987; Urban 
Foundation, 1990). Unfortunately, there is little systematic evidence about the ultimate fate 
of the decentralisation points (but see Phalatse, 2000; Hawkins, 2010; Hosking and Haines, 
                                                          
9
 Industrialists could not own these sites, but rather leased the buildings.  
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1997; Nel and Meston, 1996; Hunter, 2010). It appears that many of these places have 
indeed slumped. Places such as Dimbaza and Butterworth that were propped up by 
subsidies were devastated by their sudden withdrawal in the 1990s. Funeral parlours for the 
victims of HIV-Aids became the biggest users of the empty factory premises. Phalatse (2000) 
suggests that the removal of incentives was the main reason for the decline of Mogwase in 
the North-West, although other factors were also important, including global competition, 
poor market conditions and unionization. Black and Roux (1991) argued that the generous 
incentives of the 1980s attracted firms which were unprofitable and removed the pressure 
for efficiency. When the subsidies were withdrawn, the companies went bankrupt.   
Yet it is also clear that some places have avoided dramatic decline. Rosslyn and Richards Bay 
are two examples, although both continue to benefit from other forms of state support (see 
below). In addition, there were broader economic shifts occurring that damaged the 
prospects of peripheral locations. For various reasons which have not been properly 
investigated, there has been a general reconcentration of economic activity in the large 
cities over the last two decades. It appears to be linked to the growth of financial and 
business services, retailing and consumption, as suggested in Chapter 3. Trade liberalization, 
import penetration and labour regulations have also hindered the growth of low-waged 
industries most attracted to peripheral locations (Bhorat et al., 2014). Employment in 
clothing has continued to contract throughout the country, affecting all places with such 
factories (Nattrass and Seekings, 2013). The fate of particular decentralisation points is 
therefore bound up with broader shifts in their main industries. The termination of 
incentives probably contributed to their problems, but it was not the only factor.  
4.2.3  Discussion 
SA’s experience of industrial decentralisation bears similarities to trends elsewhere (see 
Chapter 2), with some important differences. Firms recruited to the periphery were engaged 
in routine, low-skilled activities, and it was difficult to attract a wider range of industries. 
Mobile plants usually did not become embedded or get upgraded, and their presence was 
often not sustained when the incentives were curtailed. The reasons for this were not 
simply attributable to flaws in policy design. Wider political and economic factors were also 
involved.  
An irony of industrial decentralisation is that it was undermined by other imperatives. The 
government’s industrialization drive through import substitution in the 1960s and 1970s 
tended to concentrate growth in the cities because of their large markets. Even under a 
centralised government with a strong spatial vision, regional policy was subordinate to 
national growth policies. Industrial dispersal can be interpreted as compensation for 
aggressive influx controls in that it tried to substitute jobs in and around the bantustans for 
migration to the cities. It worked best for industries under intense competitive pressures 
and seeking low-waged labour and subsidies, such as clothing. When conditions changed 
post-apartheid, these industries struggled to survive anywhere.   
The RIDP was also affected by the highly concentrated ownership of SA businesses. 
Although there is insufficient research on its relationship to spatial concentration, it seems 
that many SA corporates saw little advantage in the policy. The main beneficiaries were 
foreign firms in low-wage sectors; some small firms in need of the subsidies; a few state-
owned enterprises; and some larger resource-based industries. A study of the beneficiaries 
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found that “decentralised firms are not typically part of the modern, advanced capital-
intensive sectors of manufacturing” (DBSA, 1989, p.44). Some 57% of firms indicated that 
their plant was the only one in the business, while 34% indicated that theirs was the major 
plant in the enterprise. Some 62% of applications were for new ventures, with a minority for 
expansions (22%) or relocations (14%). This is consistent with Addleson and Tomlinson’s 
argument that conglomerates were growing through mergers and acquisitions, leading to “a 
rationalization of production among existing plants within an extended group [rather] than 
… relocation of the plants themselves” (1987, p.238).  
The policy was based on the assumption that most factories are mobile and that they will 
relocate if offered generous incentives. This was patently not the case. A DBSA (1989) study 
of businesses that decided not to leave the cities found that only 18% of them had made a 
serious evaluation of the possibility of relocation. Their main reasons for remaining in situ 
were to retain access to skilled, stable labour and proximity to their markets. Only a 
minority of firms facing exceptional cost pressures could contemplate the disruption of 
relocation. The RIDP was also insufficiently sensitive to the importance of local institutions 
in creating conducive conditions for incoming investment, including robust infrastructure 
and ongoing support to help firms integrate into the local economy and society. These 
weaknesses are typical of top-down spatial rebalancing policies. 
Incidentally, a similar lack of appreciation of the importance of place and location in 
economic development was apparent within the post-apartheid government. The Minister 
of Labour between 1994 and 1998 and subsequent Governor of the Reserve Bank between 
1999-2009 recently stated: “You put a tax break before a company and they rush for it. So, if 
you provide certain industrial zones with tax breaks and other incentives, I promise you, the 
logic of capital says they will go to those places” (Mboweni, 2015). Interestingly, he made 
these remarks in the context of a revealing reflection on the government’s decision to 
withdraw the RIDP incentives: 
“We removed the tax benefits that had been provided for some of the sub-industrial 
zones that had been created around SA. We made a mistake. We were too angry 
about the bantustan system, without thinking strategically. We removed all those 
benefits and companies just moved back to the East Rand and other places. All those 
industrial zones became shells, basically” (Mboweni, 2015). 
4.3  Spatial Development Initiatives (SDIs) 
SDIs were introduced in 1996 around the time the RIDP was wound up. They were 
conceived as a way to generate growth in regions with significant unrealised potential, 
recognising that this would require more than simple incentives. SDIs attempted to ‘unlock’ 
this potential by targeted interventions to improve local infrastructure and actively facilitate 
new investment (Jourdan, 1998). The concept recognised the importance of coordination 
across government (Platzky, 2000) and followed the new government’s macro-economic 
strategy in encouraging exports and private sector-led growth (Taylor, 2001; Crush and 
Rogerson, 2001; Bek et al., 2004). The idea was to address apartheid spatial distortions, but 
in ways which would enable these areas to become internationally competitive and to 
promote exports. A subsidiary objective was to foster economic empowerment through 
small, medium and micro-enterprises (SMMEs), thereby broadening the structure of the 
economy (Crush and Rogerson, 2001; Jourdan et al., 1996; Platzky, 2000).  
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In these respects the policy bore similarities to European place-based approaches, and was 
indeed influenced by that thinking. Yet the focus was still on attracting inward investment 
and external expertise, thereby resembling traditional spatial rebalancing. Some SDIs could 
also be seen as variants of growth poles with their focus on large infrastructure projects 
(such as Coega near Port Elizabeth) or resource-based capital-intensive projects (such as the 
Mozal aluminium plant near Maputo). These and several other SDIs were clearly tied to the 
dominant mineral-energy complex in SA’s economy (Bhorat et al., 2014), and did little to 
assist diversification. Linkages to local enterprises were often neglected in these instances 
(Bek et al., 2004). Hence the SDI model was a mixture of spatial rebalancing and place-based 
thinking.  
The SDI programme built on the experience of the Maputo Development Corridor set up in 
1995. It attempted to generate development along a new toll road (N4) built through a 
public-private partnership. It was also involved in redeveloping the Maputo port and efforts 
to stimulate growth along the Mpumalanga-Maputo route. The SDI programme ended in 
2001, although several of the projects continued under other guises. 
4.3.1  Policy Content  
The SDI programme was established under the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) with 
assistance from the DBSA and funding of R400m (around US$30m) from the RDP office. Each 
SDI was supposed to be a short, sharp institutional intervention lasting 12-18 months, after 
which it would be handed over to the provincial or local investment promotion agency. In 
practice, most SDIs lasted for around three years. In the first phase, investment 
opportunities and blockages (generally infrastructure) were identified, and small project 
teams were set up to work with government departments to fast-track development. 
Public-private partnerships were used to enhance the delivery of infrastructure by providing 
extra funding. Strategic investment opportunities that were thought to be capable of 
generating local spinoffs (‘anchor’ projects) were identified and marketed, along with 
ancillary ‘bankable’ projects (Jourdan, 1998).   
There were attempts to promote linkages to local businesses where they existed. Investors 
were encouraged to enter into joint ventures with local SMMEs in order to assist black 
empowerment. The project teams were also involved in a range of support activities to 
improve the environment for private investment: skills development, environmental 
assessment, improving regulatory frameworks and encouraging actors to work together 
(Platzky, 2000; Crush and Rogerson, 2001). In order to address unemployment and poverty, 
some SDIs initiated schemes to promote downstream activities and encourage more labour-
intensive and higher value added activities (Altman, 2001; Walker, 2001). Other efforts 
included training and skills upgrading, and small-scale agriculture and tourism projects. 
Some SDIs were well-conceived, broadly-based initiatives, whereas others were rather 
narrow and detached from their local economies (Bek et al., 2004).  
The initial focus was on manufacturing,10 but the concept was soon broadened to include 
economic activities with a more direct impact on unemployment and poverty (Crush and 
Rogerson, 2001). Eleven SDIs were identified throughout SA: the Maputo Corridor, 
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 Export-oriented Industrial Development Zones (IDZs) were supposed to be established in several SDIs, but in practice 
they were only developed later on. 
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Phalaborwa SDI, Platinum SDI, West Coast Investment Initiative, Fish River SDI, Wild Coast 
SDI, Richards Bay SDI, Durban and Pietermaritzburg, Lubombo SDI and the Gauteng Special 
Zones (Figure 2). The Maputo Corridor and Lubombo SDI were conceived as cross-border 
initiatives involving neighbouring countries. Most SDIs were in rural areas or small towns. 
The Gauteng project emerged out of provincial economic initiatives, and was later included 
as an SDI although it did not really fit the programme’s intentions (Rogerson, 2004). The 
focus of each SDI varied according to the region’s perceived strengths and potentials. For 
example, Richards Bay already had major infrastructure and anchor projects, so the focus 
was on addressing bottlenecks and extending linkages around the existing economic base 
(Interview with Jourdan, 2003).  
Figure 2: Spatial Development Initiatives in South Africa 
 
Several structures were set up to support the SDI programme, including a special unit in the 
DBSA, a Public-Private-Partnership unit in Treasury, and a Community-Public-Private-
Partnership Development Programme. An Overall SDI Coordinating Committee (OSDICC) 
brought together SDI project managers and senior government and parastatal officials to 
help accelerate progress. OSDICC also fed into the Cabinet Investment Cluster (CIC), which 
brought together ministers whose work impacted on the investment environment and dealt 
with decisions on large new investments (Jourdan, 1998). Political champions – high-level 
elected representatives at provincial and national levels – were appointed to ensure support 
within government and to raise the SDI’s public profile. The point is that it was a serious 
programme with considerable political backing, at least early on.  
4.3.2  Policy Impact 
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SDIs were reasonably successful at developing infrastructure. The PPP approach generated 
some additional investment that would not have occurred otherwise. New roads in rural 
areas and programmes such as malaria control (in the Lubombo SDI) improved the quality of 
life. In some SDIs, the complexity of underlying land-related issues and social disputes 
seriously impeded planned development. Kepe (2002) describes these problems in the Wild 
Coast. Several SDIs struggled to get other parts of government to provide the necessary 
support. For instance, Richards Bay SDI wanted to expand the port to allow containers, but 
this was never accepted by the state entity Portnet. The Durban SDI never got off the 
ground because of disagreements between the three government spheres.  
Several SDI evaluations conducted around 2000 suggested that private investment did not 
live up to expectations (Platzky, 2000). This helps to explain why the programme was 
downgraded. One evaluation identified 688 SDI projects involving total investment of 
R165,000m (US$12,500m) and approximately 100,000 jobs created (Crush and Rogerson, 
2001). Wider economic uncertainties linked to the Asian financial crisis and poor macro-
economic conditions in SA hampered investment at the time (Platzky, 2000; Crush and 
Rogerson, 2001). Local factors were also important, including the fact that some locations 
were chosen for purely political reasons and could not attract private investment (Jourdan, 
2003). Several project proposals put to investors were simply unrealistic (Taylor, 2000). Poor 
institutional and political conditions in several places also hindered SDI processes 
(Budlender and Shapiro, 2001; Rogerson, 2001). 
The Maputo Corridor was by far most successful at delivery on the ground. A substantial 
R80,000m (US$6,000m) in private investment and 65,000 temporary and permanent jobs 
were realized over the 1996-2001 period (De Beer, 2001). The movement of people and 
goods between SA and Mozambique increased by 27% per annum, imports rose by 58% and 
exports by 55% over the same period (De Beer, 2001). This SDI included innovative projects 
such as SMME development linked to the toll road, cluster studies, LED programmes and 
capacity building. De Beer (2001) argues that these created many local linkages and 
deepened the impact. Against this, critics have suggested that the Corridor could have done 
more to support small business development. For example, small traders were not 
sufficiently considered in planning a new border facility (Peberdy and Crush, 2001).    
Several SDIs focused on resource-based industrialisation and most private investment was 
related to mineral extraction, processing and exporting (Altman, 2001). This reflects the 
dominance of the mineral-energy complex, but raised obvious concerns about the level of 
public investment relative to the jobs created and the weak linkages into the local economy 
(Pretorius, 2001; Walker, 2001; Driver, 1998; Fitschen, 1998; Lewis and Bloch, 1998). Taylor 
(2001) argues that most jobs in SDIs were low-waged, low-skilled and casual. This is partly 
because many temporary jobs were created in the construction phase, which encouraged 
in-migration. Relatively few jobs remained afterwards, and these were mainly high-skilled 
(e.g. in the Saldanha steel plant), so those who had migrated in search of work were left 
stranded.  
Some rural SDIs never developed any momentum because of the obstacles faced. The 
Lebombo SDI focused on conservation and tourism and was relatively successful because it 
brought technical capacity to an area where this was lacking. It implemented several novel 
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and imaginative projects, including extensive support for SMMEs, and created around 4,500 
jobs altogether, although most of them were temporary (Adebayo and Todes, 2003). 
4.3.3  Discussion 
The SDI programme was certainly innovative for its time. It experimented with new 
institutional forms, helped with capacity building and included linkage programmes that 
were new to SA. Projects worked well in some areas, but less so where inappropriate 
locations were selected. It was not well-suited to places with complex social dynamics, such 
as the Wild Coast, or cities, where the Gauteng SDI soon morphed into something else. It 
seemed to work best where special agencies were established that could recruit dedicated 
and committed staff. These agencies provided essential technical capabilities and could 
operate in a flexible, non-bureaucratic manner across administrative and functional 
boundaries. They functioned as vital intermediaries between different stakeholders, spheres 
of government and communities, capable of adapting to shifting conditions. They also 
championed and pushed through a range of important development projects on the ground.  
There were several limitations of this approach, including a tendency to treat SDIs as 
substitutes for national action. Most projects suffered from insufficient support from key 
government departments and poor inter-departmental coordination. For example, a 
national strategy towards seaports might have helped align investments by the national port 
authority with the port-related SDIs. The special arrangements that were made at the outset 
to provide high level political support for the SDIs did not last long. The projects had no 
special status in government spending, so they battled for resources. Personalities played a 
big part in determining success, rather than procedures, systems or objective evidence, and 
of course people were vulnerable to politics. The Maputo Corridor received considerable 
support from its provincial premier, but when he was replaced this disappeared.   
The short timeframe of the SDIs was problematic. The emphasis on speed meant that 
participatory processes were too limited where they were really needed, such as in rural 
areas. The lack of consultation undermined local support and ultimately jeopardized the 
projects. The Maputo Corridor SDI was wound up before it could realize its potential and 
several innovative schemes were terminated. Arkwright (2003) argued that only 25% of the 
full investment potential had been achieved at the time. Although some of the projects 
continued in a different guise, many of the interesting elements that added extra value 
were curtailed. Consequently, many projects did not progress beyond the relatively ‘quick 
win’ elements focused on capital-intensive, energy-hungry resource processing schemes 
(Bhorat et al., 2014). An important message is that realising development potential is clearly 
not a quick fix. 
To conclude, the SDI programme can be seen as a form of place-based policy because of its 
adaptation to local contexts and creation of institutional capacity. There was also an 
element of spatial rebalancing through attracting investment from elsewhere. Therefore it 
was a mixed approach, implemented in different ways in different places, and not always 
connecting with local economies and communities. It appears to have been most effective 
when the place-based aspects were emphasised, i.e. strong institutions and a rounded 
approach focused on local potential. Yes this was only successful under certain 
circumstances and more could have been achieved if the embedding effects had been 
sustained.  
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4.4  Industrial Development Zones (IDZs) 
IDZs were initially mooted as part of the SDI programme, but their introduction was delayed 
until 2000. They were specially-built industrial precincts linked to a seaport or airport and 
designed for export-related activities. They were flagship schemes intended to promote 
economic and employment growth through attracting foreign direct investment and 
exporting value-added commodities (DTI, 2012). The emphasis on fixed incentives aimed at 
mobile investment defines them as a form of spatial rebalancing.  
 
4.4.1  Policy Content  
Four IDZs were designated at the outset: Coega, East London, Richards Bay and OR Tambo 
International Airport. All were publicly owned and run, in some cases with provincial or 
municipal involvement. IDZs were supposed to offer environments with world-class 
infrastructure and utilities linked to an international port of entry; streamlined 
administration; a customs-controlled area allowing duty and VAT-free import of raw 
materials; service areas for suppliers; tax holidays and export incentives, and access to 
government business support programmes. However, the customs advantages could not be 
implemented, and most of the incentives were also available outside the zones (Chinguno, 
2009). The special status of the IDZs boiled down to the quality of the physical infrastructure 
within them. The DTI spent R6,000m (US$450m) on the programme by 2013 (DTI, 2013a). 
 
4.4.2  Policy Impact 
It is widely agreed that the IDZs were very slow to make an impact, even after more than a 
decade (DTI, 2012; CDE, 2012; Nel et al., 2013; McCullum, 2011). Only three IDZs became 
operational during the 2000s, and another two were established in 2013. From 2002 to 
2013, some 42 investors were attracted into the three zones, R3,000m (US$225m) was 
invested and 48,800 jobs were created (DTI, 2013a). Most of these were short-lived 
construction jobs, and only 5,200 direct jobs were created within firms in the zones. Most 
firms had capital-intensive processes and weak local linkages. The IDZs were thought to be 
held back by SA’s poor international competitiveness for manufacturing and its vulnerability 
to rising import prices (McCullum, 2011). 
The development of the Richards Bay IDZ was also constrained by land and environmental 
issues (Interview with Coetzee, 2013). It attracted a single investor by offering a large supply 
of cheap electricity. Subsequent energy constraints have inhibited the attraction of further 
investors (Financial Mail, 22/1/2015). In addition, the port only deals with bulk cargo (coal 
exports), while the IDZ aims to develop other export-related industries. Efforts to reconcile 
these conflicting agendas have not succeeded (Chinguno, 2012; Coetzee, 2013).  
The Eastern Cape IDZs have recently become slightly more successful. By 2012, Coega had 
attracted 21 investments valued at R9,000m (US$675m) and generating 2,800 jobs, 
although most were relocations from elsewhere within the region (Chinguno, 2012). Its 
performance improved subsequently, with 10 new investors in 2013/4, R2,000m (US$150m) 
worth of investment and 4,400 non-construction jobs (CDC, 2015). In 2016 Coega 
announced SA’s largest single foreign direct investment in manufacturing in 40 years, with 
an R11,000m (US$830m) Chinese vehicle assembly plant. Production is scheduled to start in 
2018 and 2,500 direct jobs are anticipated in phase 1.  
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The East London IDZ has mainly attracted existing component suppliers to the Mercedes 
Benz factory elsewhere in the city, which the firm asked to relocate into the zone. As with 
most automotive operations, these are capital intensive with modest job impacts (Chinguno, 
2012). Investment in the East London IDZ has also been growing, with a total of R4,400m 
(US$330m) invested by 2014, and 3,000 direct manufacturing and related service jobs 
created (Financial Mail, 22/1/2015).    
4.4.3  Discussion 
Evaluations of the IDZ cost-effectiveness undertaken a few years ago were damning. An 
annex to the 2013 Special Economic Zones (SEZs) Bill that proposed replacing them with 
SEZs summarised the problems succinctly:  
 
“a weak policy and legislative framework; poor institutional and governance 
arrangements; ad hoc funding arrangements that render long-term planning in 
the IDZ impossible; lack of IDZ-specific incentives; lack of targeted investment 
promotion; lack of programme definition and strategic direction, and poor 
coordination and integration” (DTI, 2013b, p.17).   
 
IDZs resemble SEZs as a form of spatial policy. While they grew out of the SDIs, developing 
the wider region has been played down. Unlike international IDZs or SEZs, there is little 
special about these zones, so their distinctive attractions are limited. Sizeable state 
investment has been slow to stimulate private investment and job creation. Poor leadership 
and coordination across government have been major hindrances, acknowledged by 
government’s own assessment quoted above.  
The 2014 SEZ Act offered more generous incentives. It permits public-private partnerships 
to establish SEZs, with streamlined governance and institutional arrangements. Whether 
this resolves the previous problems remains to be seen. The initial response of business has 
been slightly more positive than before, albeit still rather lukewarm (Financial Mail, 
22/1/2015). A stronger regional agenda is also apparent from the inclusion of a wider range 
of eligible areas with opportunities for distinctive local industrial clusters, such as agro-
processing, solar power and mining (DTI, 2015). Yet Nel and Rogerson (2014) argue that the 
SEZ incentives do not address the development constraints of peripheral regions 
sufficiently, such as the limited resources, poor infrastructure and deficient skills. In 
addition, by promising an SEZ to each province, political considerations have clearly 
intruded. The impact is bound to be very uneven, with a big risk of substantial public 
investment in places with slim prospects of self-sustaining development.  
4.5  Conclusion 
 
The SA state has been able to influence the location of economic activity, although the 
process has not been straightforward and the outcomes have been very mixed. The 
emphasis since the 1960s has been on steering investment to less-favoured regions using 
fixed incentives and improved infrastructure. In some cases, ideological objectives greatly 
outweighed economic considerations, resulting in scant impacts. Other initiatives produced 
bigger effects by targeting viable locations (e.g. close to major transport routes and sources 
of suitable labour) and complementing changes occurring within industry. The growth of 
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clothing firms in and around the homelands during the 1980s was an example. Moving to 
the assisted areas helped companies under pressure to cut costs. Thousands of jobs were 
created within the firms themselves, along with many temporary jobs in the construction of 
the infrastructure. 
 
Yet this did not generate resilient economic development. Transplanted activities were 
often routine in their levels of skill, technology and products. Most remained weakly 
embedded locally and did little to spur further enterprise or human capital development. 
Spatial policies that alter relative locational conditions through incentives and infrastructure 
tend to have little influence over the future viability of firms. They do not promote 
upgrading, modernisation or diversification to higher value, more sophisticated products. 
This is a weakness of spatial rebalancing because the regional problem can’t be solved this 
way. In some places, local institutions went beyond this by actively recruiting firms and 
creating a supportive environment, but they lacked the know-how to help firms anticipate 
and adapt to changing market conditions. Later on, nothing was done to manage decline by 
assisting workers affected by redundancy to retrain or move elsewhere. Consequently, the 
sudden withdrawal of the incentives post-apartheid devastated many of the former 
industrial decentralisation areas.   
 
The SDIs had a more flexible methodology and more dynamic capabilities, in tune with a 
place-based approach. They operated as intermediaries between stakeholders and could 
champion all sorts of new and innovative projects, although they were not sustained for 
long enough to generate real momentum. Their freedom of manoeuvre helped to make 
things happen in places that were depressed or locked into the past. In contemporary 
conditions such schemes might identify rural opportunities in commercial forestry, 
renewable energy, game farms or activity-based tourism. Yet special initiatives are not 
enough to resolve intractable political conflicts or dysfunctional local governments. They are 
also no substitute for national action to address strategic infrastructure constraints. The 
IDZs illustrate the investment capacity of national government, although they also highlight 
the risks of extravagant spending on symbolic projects when the political pressures are 
strong and financial disciplines are weak. 
 
A final observation relates to the effects of targeting particular places for attention. Singling 
out a few locations for special treatment enabled focused effort, provided visibility to 
attract external interest, and allowed scarce skills to be deployed selectively. However, the 
political difficulties of this process also undermined the impact. The high profile of 
designated places often resulted in pressure for too many areas to be designated, thereby 
diluting their effectiveness. It also caused initiatives to be curtailed or side-lined by political 
leaders before they achieved their potential. This has been a particular problem since 1994, 
with insufficient staying power to implement projects, create confidence and build 
momentum. Sustaining special arrangements has proved difficult politically, given the 
pressure to incorporate and control them within local or provincial government. The lack of 
an overarching national spatial framework has exacerbated these problems and meant 
inconsistent support across government.  
 
Although SA has experimented with new and innovative approaches to regional 
development, they have not been sufficiently well-conceived and developed to be truly 
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effective. There has been insufficient research and systematic learning from these initiatives 
to inspire confidence that decision-makers know what work’s best. The following chapter 
identifies similar concerns in relation to locally-based initiatives.   
 
 
Chapter 5: The Experience of Area-Based Initiatives 
5.1. Introduction 
The government has introduced a variety of area-based initiatives post-apartheid, intended 
to ameliorate poverty in the townships and to revitalise the inner cities. There has been 
greater appetite for spatial targeting to tackle concentrated hardship within cities than for 
targeting at the regional scale. Area-based policies have coincided with efforts to extend 
basic infrastructure and services across the cities, which is consistent with space-neutral 
ideas. Area initiatives have also been used to a lesser extent in rural areas. Spatial targeting 
in the countryside is discussed briefly here since it illustrates some of the difficulties of 
catalysing local development in context of dispersed populations.11   
Like many urban programmes in Europe and the USA, SA initiatives have been very 
ambitious in scope, including complex social reconstruction and development objectives. 
Similarly, the emphasis in practice has often turned out to be more physical - upgrading the 
environment, infrastructure and housing - partly because this is easiest to execute. Some 
initiatives have followed a place-based approach, in the sense of broad-based strategies 
involving multiple stakeholders and different parts of government. There has been 
considerable emphasis on institutional development and citizen participation, alongside 
more tangible outcomes. For example, initiatives have sought to introduce new approaches 
to governance, innovation and experimentation, to expand training and capacity building in 
government, and to pursue social redress, transformation, and urban renewal. This is all 
consistent with place-based thinking.  
The definition of a ‘local area’ for these initiatives has varied greatly. Many are very large in 
terms of demographics or territorial extent, especially compared to international 
equivalents focused on a single neighbourhood or business precinct. Local areas in SA have 
ranged from central business districts to huge townships with several hundred thousand 
people. Urban townships have been prominent objects of spatial targeting. This is often 
where most people live, quite unlike the deprived neighbourhoods targeted in the North 
that are home to a disadvantaged minority. The progressive upgrading of the townships, 
and the deepening of democracy through popular participation, are therefore vital for the 
stability and cohesion of the country as a whole. In some rural contexts, whole district 
councils ranging over hundreds of square kilometres and up to a million people have been 
the target area. In many respects they are more accurately described as regions than 
localities.  
Four major government programmes are discussed here. They differ in their institutional 
design, funding arrangements and operational focus. The first two attached greater 
                                                          
11
 There have also been area-based initiatives organised by municipalities. The most important was 
eThekwini’s Area-Based Management Programme. This is not discussed here since the focus is on national 
policies. Robinson et al. (2004) discuss some of the early initiatives.  
46 
 
emphasis to strengthening local institutions and coordinating action at locality level 
(essentially a ‘bottom-up’ perspective), while the latter two have been more concerned with 
ensuring that national support is tailored to the needs of different areas (more of a ‘top-
down’ perspective). 
Special Integrated Presidential Projects (SIPPs) were launched in 1994 as part of a range of 
programmes to initiate the RDP. The aim was to “kickstart development in major urban 
areas, focusing on violence-torn communities and communities in crisis” (RDP White Paper, 
1995). SIPPs were pilot projects to accelerate delivery of basic services and to create jobs 
within a framework of social transformation. The urgency was palpable because these areas 
had recently been wracked by conflict and instability. For example, the Kathorus group of 
townships on the East Rand had been the epicentre of a violent power struggle between 
1990 and 1994 that claimed at least 3,000 lives (Bonner and Nieftagodien, 2001). The SIPPs 
were also intended to introduce more participatory methods of planning and development 
(to give people a stronger voice) and more integrated forms of governance and finance. 
They were initially seen as short-term, 5 year projects, although several continued beyond 
this (Rust and Napier, 2002). The Cato Manor Development Project (CMDP) in Durban was 
one of these. It continued until 2002 with supplementary funding from the EU. Its remit was 
to redevelop a large tract of well-located land12 for a mixed income population, including 
the very poor, using new planning principles to promote integrated development.  
The Urban Renewal Programme (URP) and Integrated Sustainable Rural Development 
Programme (ISRDP) were introduced in 2001 as 10 year nodal schemes intended to address 
poverty and underdevelopment in a selection of urban townships and rural areas. The 
mechanism was coordinated action by various spheres of government to accelerate the 
provision of infrastructure, basic services and social services (COGTA, 2010). The 
establishment of rural nodes was partly rooted in concerns about the failure of previous 
rural development efforts, linked to poor coordination of activities. Hence the nodes were 
also seen as spaces to experiment with new styles of governance, with improved 
intergovernmental collaboration, and more public participation (COGTA, 2009b). 
The Neighbourhood Development Partnership Grant (NDPG) was introduced in 2006 as a 
10 year programme to provide technical assistance and a capital grant to improve the 
“quality of life for township residents through the creation of economically viable and 
sustainable township neighbourhoods” (National Treasury, 2007, p. vii). Support was 
provided for “neighbourhood development projects that provide community infrastructure 
and create the platform for private sector development and that improve the quality of life 
of residents in targeted areas” (Ibid.). Like several previous programmes, the intention was 
also to promote good practice and innovation in township development.   
The Urban Development Zones (UDZs) were more narrowly focused on the renewal of run-
down inner cities through property (re)development. The incentive was channelled directly 
to the private sector, unlike the three other programmes. The purpose of stimulating private 
investment in property was to encourage economic development and job creation. The 
programme was originally planned to run from 2004 to 2009, but was then extended twice 
to 2019 because of its apparent success in several major cities.   
                                                          
12
 The land was partially vacant because the community had been forcibly removed in the 1960s. 
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The chapter draws on a limited academic literature and a range of government reports, 
supplemented by interviews with officials who played key roles in these programmes, or 
who observed them closely from other parts of government. Most interviewees were no 
longer directly involved, and were able to reflect thoughtfully on the programme’s 
strengths, limitations and wider lessons. Several of the reports are also frank and forthright 
in their assessments, making them a useful basis for analysis.  
5.2  Policy Content 
Seven SIPPs were defined at the outset, increasing later to 13 projects in all provinces. They 
varied from large multi-dimensional initiatives to more narrowly-defined schemes. They 
were located in urban and rural areas, major cities and smaller towns. The SIPPs were 
selected on the basis of their visibility, relevance and potential for impact, their capacity to 
be implemented, their contribution to the creation of viable communities, and their 
alignment with housing policy objectives. The largest and most visible projects were 
Kathorus, Cato Manor, the Integrated Serviced Land Project in Cape Town, and Duncan 
Village in East London. A dedicated project team was set up in each area, with varying 
structures and lines of responsibility. Since local government was still in a transitional phase, 
SIPPs often had considerable operational autonomy. The SIPPs programme initially fell 
under the RDP ministry, but it was later moved to the Department of Housing (Rust and 
Napier, 2002).  
The SIPPs had large budgets from national RDP funds (altogether R1,880m (US$140m)). The 
funds were granted on condition that matching resources were secured from provincial and 
local government, and that they also bore the recurrent costs of the projects. Most of the 
money was spent on the provision of essential infrastructure (clean water, sanitation, 
storm-water drainage, electricity and surfacing roads), free housing and community facilities 
(community centres, clinics, childcare facilities, public safety, community education, 
recreational amenities, sports fields and public spaces). Economic development was not 
very prominent in most SIPPs.  
The URP and ISRDP did not receive the same level of dedicated government funding as the 
SIPPs. It was assumed they would attract funds from all spheres of government because of 
their status as presidential projects. Encouraging coordination between government 
departments was a major objective. Seven urban renewal nodes were defined across the 
major cities. Most covered townships with high unemployment and poverty, and many were 
larger than the previous SIPPs. For example, in Durban the Inanda KwaMashu Ntuzuma (INK) 
area (with around 500,000 people) was much larger than Cato Manor (planned for 180,000 
people). The rural nodes covered whole districts or municipalities. At the outset there were 
ten rural nodes, defined on the basis of poverty, infrastructure backlogs and population 
density. Another three were added later to ensure a national spread (COGTA, 2010). While 
the urban nodes had dedicated project teams, the rural nodes were often run by municipal 
officials with other responsibilities as well. Large ‘anchor’ projects were defined in each 
node as a focus for departmental coordination. In urban areas these tended to be 
integrated development schemes, such as Bridge City in Durban and the Khayelitsha CBD 
programme in Cape Town. In rural areas the focus was on water, infrastructure, agriculture, 
tourism or enterprise development (Ibid.). National coordination was supposed to occur 
through an Interdepartmental Task Team chaired by the national department of local 
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government. There was also a complex system of local, provincial and national champions 
for each project.  
 
The NDPG was set up as a focused unit within National Treasury to provide municipalities 
with technical support and capital grants to undertake township development delivering a 
“social, economic and financial return” (National Treasury, 2007, p. vii). By 2011, some 
R8,800m (US$660m) had been spent on 90 townships in 57 municipalities (National 
Treasury, 2011). Considerable effort also went into training officials and producing good 
practice guidelines. To apply for funds, municipalities had to produce township renewal 
strategies in which their projects were located. Many URP projects benefited from NDPG 
grants because they were already operational and were well-placed to secure the funding. 
However, the NDPG supported a much wider range of townships, including in small towns 
and dense rural areas such as Bushbuckridge. Some 59% was allocated to metros and 
secondary cities, and the remainder to towns and rural areas (Ibid.).  
 
Since 2012, the NDPG has changed focus to promote higher density, mixed-use 
development along public transport corridors that link townships to central cities. This 
represents a shift from a spatial targeting approach to one that emphasizes connectivity 
between residential areas and economic centres. The NDPG is now solely concerned with 
the eight metros and 10 secondary cities. NDPG supported projects that were previously 
focused on small towns and rural areas were transferred to the Department of Rural 
Development and Land Reform because of capacity constraints within the National Treasury 
(Interview with Van Niekerk, 2013).  
 
Finally, UDZs provide for an accelerated depreciation allowance to reduce tax on investment 
in new buildings and improvements to existing buildings. Some 15 municipalities were 
invited to designate UDZs in core urban areas that had gone into decline following the 
relocation of businesses to suburban nodes and outlying business parks. These areas had 
once made a major contribution to municipal rates, but were now experiencing physical 
decay, vacant and derelict buildings, and a loss of confidence among land owners and 
investors. One of the conditions of national approval was that the target areas had to be an 
explicit priority in the municipality’s IDP and resources had to be made available to support 
regeneration efforts. This was to ensure alignment between local and national policies.  
 
5.3  Policy Impact 
Assessing the impact of these initiatives is difficult because of their diverse objectives and 
the paucity of systematic evidence. The following sections outline the overall performance 
of each programme separately, and then discuss their economic aspects all together 
because they share certain features in common. Discussion of the UDZs is confined to the 
latter section.   
5.3.1 Special Integrated Presidential Projects  
The official evaluations of the larger SIPPs were generally very positive about the scale of 
activity they generated (Rust and Napier, 2002). They were effective at delivering housing, 
infrastructure and services. They also incorporated elements of innovation in their 
approach. Some SIPPs received Best Practice awards from UN-Habitat. Cato Manor 
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succeeded in providing substantial amounts of infrastructure and housing in a highly 
charged, conflict-ridden environment, although it took several years before it had 
established sufficient trust and credibility for delivery to proceed. It pioneered mechanisms 
to encourage community engagement, outreach and support that were unfamiliar in the 
country at the time (Robinson et al., 2004). These achievements were offset by the 
standardised housing design. Being located close to the heart of the city warranted higher 
density development, but no flexibility was allowed for in the national housing model. The 
projects run by SIPPs were often judged to be islands of excellence within their 
municipalities (Rust and Napier, 2002). Unfortunately there is no systematic evidence 
available to judge whether they had an enduring impact on socio-economic conditions.  
5.3.2  Urban Renewal Programme and Integrated Strategic Rural Development 
Programme  
The URP nodes were also considered quite successful at delivering basic infrastructure. They 
were often implemented through the municipal line departments. Having formal URP status 
put pressure on these departments to focus their efforts there. Innovation was a feature of 
some of these schemes, such as the INK social programmes and the Mitchells Plain Violence 
Prevention through Urban Upgrading programme, funded by the German government. Like 
the SIPPs, some of these projects managed to operate reasonably well in very tough 
environments. Yet several URP nodes were unsuccessful, including some of those in the 
Eastern Cape, because of political and institutional complications.  
The ISRDP nodes were generally less successful than the URPs. They had to cover huge rural 
areas and lacked dedicated implementation units and budgets. The institutional position of 
those responsible for delivery was weak and they found it difficult to attract and retain 
skilled staff. There were many small, isolated projects that struggled to gain any traction and 
momentum. Supporting the growth of small enterprises in rural areas seemed particularly 
difficult. The urban nodes found it easier to attract national and provincial funding and to 
crowd in investment from the private sector and foreign donors. When national and 
provincial departments did invest in the rural nodes, it was not necessarily in ISRDP projects 
(COGTA, 2010). Some of the rural anchor projects were simply overambitious. For instance, 
the Ugu Fresh Produce Market cost R20m, but failed to attract sufficient farm produce to be 
viable (COGTA, 2010).  
The URPs devoted less attention to socio-economic objectives, such as developing people’s 
skills, because of the pressure to accelerate physical delivery. Improving schools, hospitals, 
and other social services was not part of their remit, despite these being serious obstacles 
to human development in most areas. In 2006 the URPs were criticized for being 
insufficiently innovative or people-centred. A positive outcome was the fall in crime in the 
urban nodes between 2001 and 2008 because of improved roads, CCTV cameras and visible 
policing (COGTA, 2009b). 
Institutional coordination of project planning, budgeting and implementation was a general 
challenge, particularly in rural areas. The integrated area-based approach of the URPs and 
ISRDPs did not align well with the functional perspective of line departments. It was also 
difficult to find the most appropriate institutional location for the projects within 
labyrinthine municipal and provincial administrations, so many struggled to mobilise 
support (COGTA, 2010). These experiences are unsurprising bearing in mind the uneven 
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capacity within government in SA, reinforced by political divisions and power dynamics. Yet 
there were also some successes. The Alexandra Renewal Project devised service level 
agreements with municipal departments to secure their involvement.  
There were also limitations in the way many projects were set up, from a technical and 
institutional perspective. Common-sense advice was often neglected, such as the need for 
clear focus, strong vision, integrated planning and budgeting, sound management and 
avoidance of political interference (COGTA, 2009b, 2010). Identifying political champions to 
mobilise support sometimes worked well. Yet in other cases the political champions lost 
interest, were too busy or were ineffectual. Sometimes there were too many champions, 
which diluted their support (Ibid.). Many projects were slow to get going because of political 
resistance and procedural delays in acquiring and developing land (Interview with Leon, 
2013). The Alexandra Project never resolved the fundamental land and housing problems in 
the central area. These continue to bedevil the township’s revitalization.  
5.3.3  Neighbourhood Development Partnership Grant  
A three-year assessment of the NDPG undertaken in 2010 found that it performed 
reasonably well across its objectives, but was undermined by municipal weaknesses 
(National Treasury, 2010). Indeed, more than half of the 57 municipalities were rated as 
medium or low in their technical capacity (National Treasury, 2009). As a result, 40% of 
NDPG projects were found to require urgent support. Their main challenges were political 
interference, corruption, high staff turnover, technical obstacles and land issues. The 
Treasury’s NDPG unit was stretched far too thinly to support all the NDPG municipalities.  
The NDPG encouraged many municipalities to devote more attention to their townships, 
which were somewhat neglected by their line departments (Interview with Pernegger, 
2013). It sought to build skills and competence through its training programmes and 
resource materials. It was reasonably effective in delivering physical infrastructure, although 
former officials suggest that insufficient attention was paid to human, social and economic 
development (Interview with Karuri-Sebina, 2013). This raised doubts about its ultimate 
impact, which contributed to the shift in focus in 2012 (Interview with van Niekerk, 2013). 
Questions have also been raised about whether the NDPG substituted for funding that 
would have been secured from other programmes (Interview with Karuri-Sebina, 2013).  
5.3.4  Common Economic Pitfalls 
Most area-based initiatives incorporated an economic development component. These took 
various forms, including: (i) small business advice, financial support and networking; (ii) 
dedicated space for informal traders to operate; (iii) support for craft production; (iv) 
cooperatives and marketing; (v) job training and skills development; (vi) cultural and 
heritage tourism; (vii) food production and urban agriculture; (viii) preparing land for 
industrial and commercial activity, and (ix) making townships more investment friendly 
through business improvement districts and enhanced security (DPLG, 2006; Nel et al., 
2004).  
Physical infrastructure was typically a much larger feature of their efforts, as is the case 
internationally. There was an implicit assumption that investment in infrastructure would 
lead to economic development and jobs – a kind of ‘build it and they will come’ supply-side 
51 
 
philosophy. There was little understanding of the multiple factors influencing the demand 
for property in their areas. There were instances of poor planning and insufficient 
appreciation of market forces in all these programmes. It was often assumed that 
designated nodes and corridors would attract more private investment than they did, 
resulting in an oversupply of land. This occurred even in the most lauded projects, such as 
Cato Manor, where the demand for commercial and industrial land and premises was 
greatly overestimated. Most initiatives could not anticipate the take-up of land and 
premises because of their poor grasp of property market dynamics. They viewed their 
localities in isolation of the wider urban economy.    
Most initiatives also struggled to expand the base of SMMEs in their areas. Some found it 
easier to implement public works programmes offering temporary work experience (COGTA, 
2010). Karuri-Sebina (2014) demonstrates that many NDPG projects had a narrow 
understanding of township enterprise. Her study of two townships identified a range of 
unrecognized entrepreneurial activities. Hence there are potential opportunities that might 
be uncovered using a more careful approach rooted in the locality. Strengthening human 
capital, vocational skills, micro-finance and business competences are important ingredients 
of any township revitalization strategy. Even so, SMMEs struggle to compete with and break 
out of the stranglehold exerted on local consumer markets by SA’s powerful producers and 
retailers (Philip et al., 2014).  
Township economic initiatives often seem too insular, unambitious and detached from 
wider city development efforts using the core functions of municipalities (Robbins, 2012). 
They don’t do enough to alter the marginal economic status and negative perceptions of 
townships. Few attempts are made to encourage private firms, public entities or even 
municipal branch offices to locate in and around the townships rather than in established 
centres (interview with Karuri-Sebina, 2013). This would require a concerted approach to 
overcome the fear of the unknown and perceived risks of moving to unfamiliar locations. 
Public bodies could make financial savings if they sold or leased their valuable central city 
properties and occupied cheaper premises in the townships. Light manufacturing 
operations, call centres and other large employers of less-skilled workers would also benefit 
from proximity to residential areas and lower property costs. Despite the political salience 
of township transformation, it seems that the idea of spatial rebalancing through 
transferring investment and jobs has not featured strongly. 
The developers of industrial and commercial property have generally avoided the 
townships. Shopping centres are the exception. These were the target of several township 
anchor projects, and regarded as ‘low hanging fruit’ (Interview with Pernegger, 2013). This 
reflected a broader trend towards retail malls in the townships to capture the growth in 
local consumer spending. Some 76 township shopping centres have been built since 1995, 
accounting for 65% of all township shopping centres ever constructed, and 75% of floor 
space (Demacon, 2010). Almost half (32) of these have been built since 2005. Their average 
size also grew from 6,500m2 to nearly 20,000m2, and some 54,300 jobs have been created 
altogether. The impact of township malls on local SMMEs has been hotly debated. Local 
enterprises benefit from the improved range of facilities and services, but unfair 
competition is a serious concern. The impact on the performance of local businesses seems 
to depend on their distance from the centre (they suffer within 2-5km) and the type of 
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activity (TTRI, 2012; Donaldson and Du Plessis, 2012). Ligthelm (2010) shows that 48% of 
pre-existing firms within 5km of the Jabulani Mall in Soweto closed within two years.  
Some of the UDZs have been far more successful at attracting other commercial and 
residential property development. The introduction of the programme seems to have 
coincided with a turnaround in the perceptions of CBDs, complemented by municipal efforts 
to revitalise their downtowns. Yet the impact has also been very uneven. The four largest 
metros accounted for 91% of new private investment in all the UDZs (Demacon, 2013). The 
UDZ incentives were most effective where the municipalities took active steps to market the 
scheme, improve the public realm and reduce crime and grime. The Johannesburg UDZ was 
most successful because it was actively promoted by the city’s Development Agency, and 
used in conjunction with City Improvement Districts and a dedicated budget for the inner 
city. Demacon (2013) estimate that some 65,000 construction jobs and over R11,800m 
(US$890m) investment was attracted to Johannesburg’s inner city, including the conversion 
of empty office buildings into affordable housing.  
Across all 15 municipalities it is estimated that R917m (US$70m) of tax revenue was forgone 
by the UDZs, offset by investment leveraged at an impressive ratio of 1:27. This generated a 
ripple effect of some 78,000 temporary jobs in construction. Demacon argues that there 
was no displacement effect, although a striking 80% of investors would probably have gone 
ahead without the incentive. The same level of subsidy was probably not required in each 
city. The property market in Cape Town’s CBD was already quite strong, so the incentive 
may have provided the developers with a windfall and contributed to an oversupply of 
offices. A separate concern in Cape Town is the buoyant property prices and eviction of low 
income communities from gentrifying areas on the fringe of the CBD. This is undermining an 
important policy objective to increase the supply of affordable, well-located housing (Pirie, 
2007; Sinclair-Smith and Turok, 2012). The point is that automatic incentives applied 
without detailed knowledge of local property market dynamics may have counter-
productive effects.  
5.4  Conclusion  
There has been a great deal of experimentation with area-based initiatives in SA since 1994, 
involving considerable public expenditure. The contexts have ranged from run-down inner 
cities to impoverished townships and marginal rural districts. The imperative to ameliorate 
poverty and treat social need has been a much bigger influence on the selection of target 
areas than realising economic potential. Consequently, area initiatives have had to operate 
in challenging environments of historic neglect and social distress. Some initiatives have 
been essentially top-down in character, while others have been shaped more from the 
bottom-up. 
Their impact and effectiveness have been very mixed in practice. Some have invested 
sizeable public resources delivering major programmes of basic infrastructure, housing and 
public services which have improved the quality of life and dignity of thousands of people. 
Overcrowded townships have been made more liveable by enhanced public facilities, 
community centres, retail amenities and public spaces. An area-based approach has proved 
useful for addressing the inter-connected problems through visible state-sponsored 
agencies operating in the locality. These initiatives have probably been more responsive to 
community needs and dynamics than large municipal bureaucracies would have been. 
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In other places, area-based initiatives have struggled to mobilise resources, to create 
organisational capacity and to implement their objectives. They have encountered 
innumerable obstacles, interminable delays, recalcitrant officials and uncooperative 
community leaders. Projects were easily sabotaged by unsympathetic officials or jealous 
politicians elsewhere in government. Those in rural districts were the most problematic, 
partly because they were structured in ways that made it difficult to succeed, such as having 
impossibly large territories to cover. Area-based initiatives also cannot be expected to 
eliminate deep-seated social and economic problems or transform government policies. 
The capacity of a local agency to take positive initiatives appears to have had an important 
influence on the outcome of these programmes. Working in pressurised environments of 
physical decay, discontent and competition for scarce resources required relatively 
autonomous organisations to go ahead and get things done. These are not places where the 
private sector is keen to invest. They are areas which were bypassed historically and where 
municipalities often find it difficult to function well because of heightened community 
frustrations and social tensions. Consequently, these places require special attention and an 
unconventional approach to governance. 
An important aspect of this is the creation of technical capabilities to prepare and manage 
physical projects. Dedicated multi-disciplinary project units can undertake the varied tasks 
of conceiving, planning, financing, organizing and implementing development schemes on 
the ground. The successful area-based initiatives were able to assemble dynamic teams with 
the necessary skills and experience to carry out their mandate and deliver tangible outputs 
as intended. This was most important in cities and towns where the municipalities were 
weak, indifferent or thinly stretched. The relative autonomy of special units and dedicated 
teams also created space for creativity and innovation. 
Another determinant of success is the legitimacy of area-based initiatives to act as 
instruments of change. Delivery requires at least the tacit approval of ordinary citizens, 
community leaders, elected politicians, public officials and other stakeholders. Effective 
projects built relationships with these groups to allay their fears and suspicions, to manage 
their expectations, and to promote trust and shared objectives. They also engaged with 
different spheres and entities of government to get their backing. At best they were able to 
cajole, encourage and persuade others to actively support their efforts to upgrade these 
locations. Building credibility and support often took considerable time, which was not 
factored into project timetables and financial frameworks. Insufficient patience among 
government departments and funders meant that several initiatives were terminated 
prematurely, before they achieved their potential. 
Physical investments were favoured over social and economic projects because they were 
more visible and simpler to deliver. It was a matter of securing public resources and 
following established procedures to organize the activity. Producing public infrastructure, 
housing and related facilities did not rely upon an unpredictable private sector or other 
capricious stakeholders. Creating jobs and supporting business growth required different 
skill-sets, knowledge and external interactions. With more scope and time for 
experimentation, they might have done more to develop local enterprise, consistent with a 
place-based approach. They may also have capitalized upon the large retail investments in 
the townships for various economic spinoffs. 
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Summing up, SA’s experience of area initiatives lends more support to the need for spatial 
targeting than to the space-neutral approach. There is sufficient evidence of worthwhile 
projects in unpromising locations to suggest that focused government action can add value 
and make a difference to conditions on the ground. Of course this is not straightforward and 
it requires concerted effort. More could have been achieved with greater influence over 
mainstream people-centred policies, such as education. The continuing underperformance 
of schools in deprived areas acts as a powerful brake on social progress. Finally, there has 
been insufficient effort to generate useful principles and practical lessons from the 
experience of area-based targeting in SA over the last two decades.  
 
Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
6.1 Summary 
 
SA is one of the most unequal and unevenly developed countries in the world, with 
exceptional gaps in living standards between and within regions. These reflect the long 
history of an economic and political system designed for a minority, which forced society 
apart and confined the poor majority to marginal rural areas and overcrowded urban 
townships. Spatial polarisation has persisted post-apartheid because the economic structure 
and distribution of know-how have not changed fundamentally and because the 
government’s prime response to poverty and inequality has been social welfare, particularly 
outside the cities. There is a tendency among decision-makers to portray geographical 
disparities as a simple dualism between prosperous urban areas and deprived rural areas, 
overlooking their interdependence and internal differences. Uneven development is usually 
framed as an issue purely of equity and redress, with less recognition that it also has a 
bearing upon the functioning of the economic system and could be a source of inefficiency, 
insecure growth and missed opportunities. There is little appreciation of how much place 
and location matter for prosperity of the country as a whole, and of the need to factor 
spatial considerations more deliberately into economic and social policy-making. 
 
In fact, spatial issues have been played down since 1994, partly because of their sensitivity 
and potential for sowing division. There has been no explicit national spatial framework, and 
no policy towards migration and urbanisation. There has been a tendency to react passively 
to business and household location decisions, rather than to be pro-active in trying to 
stimulate and manage development in particular kinds of places. The main response to 
spatial inequalities has been to skew substantial amounts of social spending towards 
marginalised communities in rural areas through social grants and free public services. This 
is broadly consistent with a space-neutral, people-centred approach. It has alleviated 
misery, maintained some level of cohesion and curbed political opposition to the ruling 
party. However, it hasn’t offered a sufficient or lasting solution to the underlying problem of 
uneven development and lack of economic dynamism. Above all, people want jobs and 
livelihoods, and many are forced into long and costly migration and commuting patterns to 
centres of employment elsewhere. The resource allocations respond to population shifts 
but do not help fast-growing provinces and municipalities to plan ahead and invest in the 
infrastructure required for future expansion. This is one of the reasons why the 
government’s approach has arguably failed to realise the economic potential of the 
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country’s major cities. Meanwhile, the continuing fragmentation of urban development 
requires inefficient public transport subsidies, costly bulk infrastructure provision and poses 
problems for firms whose workers have to endure complicated and congested commutes.  
 
In practice, there has been an eclectic mix of spatial programmes and initiatives 
implemented across SA over the last two decades. In some respects, this can be seen as a 
period of extensive trial and testing, using different development tools and techniques, 
many of which have originated in different parts of government. Energetic individuals and 
agencies have used the ambiguities in overall policy direction and political leadership to 
apply ideas from international experience and to pioneer new thinking based on domestic 
realities. Some of these initiatives appear to have been reasonably successful considering 
the inauspicious circumstances.  
 
An alternative interpretation is less sanguine. The diversity of recent experience suggests 
the absence of a systematic approach and insufficient strategic thinking about the best way 
to tackle spatial inequalities. There has been very little objective and transparent analysis 
and measurement of areas of need or disadvantage that are eligible for special support. 
Considerable effort has been expended on piecemeal initiatives, but with little continuity 
and no attempt to consolidate the practical learning from experience. Some ill-conceived 
projects have been fast-tracked in different places with little public debate or reflection on 
the underlying principles, so efforts have been duplicated and mistakes repeated. With 
more rigorous evaluation and careful consideration of past efforts, the government could by 
now have been better-placed to establish an overarching spatial policy framework and to 
execute more effective strategies. A more substantial base of research and evidence on the 
problems, issues and dynamics discussed in this paper would also help to formulate more 
effective policies. 
  
6.2 The relevance of different spatial policy approaches to SA  
 
The space-neutral approach is relevant to current dilemmas facing SA in recognising the 
distinctive economic contribution of cities and in cautioning against extravagant public 
investments in marginal locations with little prospect of self-sustaining growth. However, it 
neglects the need to strengthen institutions in lagging regions and is too dismissive of the 
growth potential of smaller cities and towns. In addition, spatial inequalities within cities are 
not addressed. Therefore it risks perpetuating the polarisation between affluent and poor 
areas, which is a source of persistent frustration and grievance, particularly in the urban 
townships. The precarious character of contemporary rural-urban migration flows is also 
unsatisfactory. A recent indication of rising discontent was the outcome of the local 
government elections in August 2016, when the ANC lost majority control of four of the five 
major metros. Many township residents expressed their disaffection by abstaining or voting 
for the Economic Freedom Fighters, a new party advocating revolutionary change. The 
ANC’s vote held up better in the rural areas. 
 
The spatial rebalancing approach is also pertinent in suggesting that some forms of 
economic activity could usefully be located outside the big cities, or in major nodes within 
them, where there is more land available and labour costs are lower. Renewable energy, 
activity tourism and government back offices are potential examples. The case for larger-
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scale spatial rebalancing is currently not compelling because of sluggish economic growth in 
SA, and the need to bolster and expand existing economic centres by reinvesting in urban 
infrastructure and productive capacity, rather than dissipating energy and resources 
elsewhere. Selective financial inducements and improvements in connecting infrastructure 
within less-developed regions can support certain transplanted activities. Yet doubts remain 
about their long-term viability without the high level functions and knowledge required to 
upgrade and adapt over time to shifting market conditions. Supporting higher rates of local 
enterprise formation and growth are also important for development to be sustained. There 
may be a stronger case for spatial rebalancing within cities through relatively low cost 
improvements to township economic infrastructure, which continue to be disadvantaged by 
their historic neglect. 
 
The place-based approach is probably the most relevant approach to SA because it 
recognises the distinctive development trajectories of different places and the need to 
understand and strengthen local capabilities. It promises more responsive and integrated 
economic policies to improve business start-up, growth and dynamism in all regions, along 
with the necessary institutions and policy instruments to bring this about. For example, 
agriculture, agro-processing, fish-farming and commercial forestry have greater potential in 
many rural areas than is achieved at present. Enhancing the capacity and know-how of local 
governments to experiment with different ideas and to take bold initiatives is vital in fraught 
environments marked by uncertainty and social dissatisfaction. Having the credibility and 
networks to tap into the resources and capabilities of other spheres of government and 
other stakeholders in the business and community sectors is also critical to achieving a 
sufficient scale and breadth of activity to make a difference.         
   
Summing up, it should be possible for the country to combine a spatially focused, place-
based approach to drive economic growth with a commitment to ensure that no-one is left 
behind. Governments can respect geographical inequalities and diversity without 
undermining constitutional rights to public goods or alienating particular constituencies. 
Promoting greater prosperity, inclusion and political stability require treating places 
differently, while supporting them all to some extent, i.e. a differentiated approach. Places 
warrant varied policy mixes to tackle their specific constraints and to realise their distinctive 
potential. Society should be better-off with stronger growth, more jobs and improved living 
conditions if state spending is aligned more closely to the development problems and 
possibilities of different places. By tapping into diverse local experiences there should be 
more opportunities to experiment, observe and learn from the variety. 
 
6.3 The implications of SA’s experience for wider spatial policy debates 
 
SA’s experience of geographical targeting has several implications for recent ideas and 
debates about spatial policy. The importance of three particular factors appears to have 
been underestimated in the literature. First, the structure and dynamics of national 
economies exert a powerful influence on the possibility of altering regional trajectories and 
achieving more balanced outcomes. SA’s concentrated economy and obstacles to new 
entrants have inhibited the emergence and growth of secondary economic centres with 
high levels of entrepreneurial dynamism. During the 1980s industrial firms considered 
moving away from the cities to lower cost areas because they were facing intense price 
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competition. Lacklustre growth since the 1990s has suppressed the pressures of congestion 
and overheating that might otherwise have spurred further dispersal. Expanding sectors, 
such as business and financial services, require proximity to their customers and specialised 
skills in the cities, so they are less mobile than routine industrial activities.  
 
Second, social cohesion creates stability and makes it easier to introduce and sustain spatial 
policies. Hence it is to some extent a precondition of regional policy, as well as an objective 
or outcome. SA has extensive experience of marginalised communities being suspicious of 
state-sponsored initiatives and impatient for tangible progress on the ground. In pressurised 
environments, communication suffers, consultative processes get disrupted and planned 
projects are prevented from proceeding. Business interests also undermine confidence by 
withholding investment or locating elsewhere. In a context of insecurity, misunderstanding 
and mistrust, stakeholders struggle to reach agreement on development priorities and 
policy actions. The uncertainty and volatility engender a culture of short-termism and fire-
fighting among public authorities. This diverts attention and energy away from the strategic 
planning and focused effort required to prevent problems arising in the first place.  
    
Third, institutional capacity is required at local and national levels. Yet the SA case reveals 
that local governments are often weakest and least reliable in the places that most need 
support. They are most vulnerable to malfunction, nepotism and subversion by vested 
interests. Spatial policies cannot assume the existence of a well-oiled state capable of using 
devolved powers and resources effectively, devising innovative plans and implementing 
agreed decisions. Local and regional authorities lack the tax base of more prosperous places 
and can struggle to attract and retain competent professionals, thereby undermining policy 
continuity and institutional memory. Special efforts may be required to build and maintain 
robust and accountable local and regional governments, with oversight and support from 
central government. This is necessary to make complex judgements about priorities, 
encourage experimentation, and form partnerships with other organisations and actors.   
 
6.4 The implications for different approaches to spatial policy  
 
In addition to these general lessons for all forms of spatial policy, the analysis of SA’s 
experience has implications for each of the three specific approaches. First spatial 
rebalancing should not be completely discarded as a form of territorial policy. There are 
some forms of economic activity that stand to benefit from the lower operating costs in 
lagging regions, especially during periods of rapid growth in booming regions when 
bottlenecks inhibit development. Selected types of foreign direct investment and routine 
industrial functions may favour less-developed regions if they trade in highly competitive 
sectors and are particularly sensitive to business costs. In conditions of low growth, the 
possibilities are more limited and there are risks in diverting investment away from core 
economic centres. In such situations it is also important to avoid providing subsidies that are 
excessive and unjustified in relation to the returns that will be generated.  
 
Second, the spatially-blind approach provides a useful reminder that people-centred policies 
are crucial for social stability and national cohesion in a context of stark spatial and socio-
economic divisions. SA’s provision of social assistance, basic services, healthcare and 
education prevents destitution, lifts morale and improves life chances in deprived 
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communities. They also enhance human capabilities and productivity, and provide a 
foundation for inclusive economic growth and development. In addition, the space-blind 
approach highlights the special economic advantages of large cities in accelerating growth 
and structural transformation. The downside of their success is transport congestion, higher 
prices of land and property, and environmental degradation. Consequently, cities need 
disproportionate public investment in infrastructure and urban growth management (akin 
to a place-based approach), and should not be treated by fiscal policy in the same way as 
smaller settlements.  
 
A major drawback of the space-blind approach is its restriction of the state’s role to 
responding to market forces, which neglects persistent short-termism, inertia and other 
failures in private sector practices. These tend to reproduce and enlarge spatial inequalities, 
and the resulting imbalances make growth less secure and sustainable. SA’s experience 
shows that collective action by the state and other agents can have a positive influence on 
development outcomes in less-favoured places. The space-blind approach also overlooks 
the inevitably uneven territorial impacts of national policies because of differences in the 
absorptive capacity of different areas. Local arrangements can add value to sectoral 
programmes by aligning different interventions to improve their effectiveness and tailoring 
their support to local conditions. In other words, spatially-blind policies still need local, 
place-based actions to strengthen human capital and institutions, especially in less-
developed territories. For example, getting schools, hospitals and basic services in rural 
areas to function better is not just about providing more staff, buildings and other 
resources. It also requires the creation of conducive physical and social environments to 
attract and retain teachers, doctors and engineers, and to engage parents, patients, citizens 
and other stakeholders in driving up standards by holding service providers to account.  
 
Third, the place-based approach supports stronger interventions, especially at the local and 
regional levels. A coherent and capable state can be more responsive to local conditions and 
provide different kinds of public goods and services in different places, all the while working 
with what’s already there. It can foster collaboration among local interests and create a 
more favourable environment for investment and enterprise. Competent local institutions 
working in partnership can provide the infrastructure, technical assistance, business 
incubators, cheap premises, skills training and financial support to offset weak 
entrepreneurial traditions and to bolster regional capabilities and competitiveness. They can 
promote social trust and longer-term decision-making, which favour creativity and 
innovation. The place-based approach also supports stronger interaction among economic 
agents and mutual learning, which can foster specialisation and unique competitive 
strengths. Regular evaluation and feedback from external actors, and enhanced citizen 
accountability, can raise standards and improve performance.  
 
Of course, the virtues of the place-based approach are not straightforward to put into 
practice, and it is not in itself a magic wand. The case of SA reveals that local institutions are 
often weak and incapable of resolving deep conflicts of interest or reconciling diverse 
priorities for development. Success is bound to be uneven between localities and regions, 
causing unease and tension. Hence there are important roles for national authorities to 
provide oversight, to establish coordination mechanisms and to strengthen capacity in the 
poorest regions. Flexibility in these multi-level governance arrangements is essential to 
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accommodate different set-ups and strategic concerns in different places, and to allow 
regular adjustment as circumstances evolve. SA shows that action surrounding the use and 
development of land is more important than generally acknowledged in place-based 
thinking, which tends to emphasize knowledge and other intangible factors. More efficient 
use of land is vital to create more productive and inclusive cities. Strengthening other local 
assets and capabilities in marginalised communities and linking them to better-off places is 
also part of the solution to overcoming disadvantage and building pathways to prosperity. A 
national spatial framework may help to contextualise local choices and clarify strategic 
opportunities for investment in connectivity and other forms of infrastructure.   
 
Beyond these policy approaches, it is important for national governments to be more aware 
of the spatial effects of their sectoral policies, which have varying outcomes and impacts 
across their territories. It is also necessary to question assumptions in all approaches that 
the state formulates and implements spatial policies in a systematic manner. The research 
presented in this paper suggests a more complex reality.  
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